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Sergent: Comparison of the Helsinki Rules to the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles:

COMPARISON OF THE HELSINKI RULES TO THE 1994 U.N.
DRAFT ARTICLES: WILL THE PROGRESSION OF
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSE LAW BE
DAMMED?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Waters of the world do not respect manmade boundaries.
Although many bodies of water rest solely within a single nation,
over 200 rivers, lakes and aquifers defy man's order and cross his
boundaries.1 These surface waters that cross national boundaries
2
are commonly known as international watercourses.
1. See Pamela LeRoy, Troubled Waters: Populationand Water Scarcity, 6 COLO.

J.

INT'L EWrvL. L. & POLY 299, 317 (1995) (citing WoRu RESOURCES INSTITUTE,
WoRL RESOURCES 1992-93 at 171 (1992) [hereinafter RESOURCES 1992-93]). The

Nile River is a prime example of a waterway that crosses national boundaries. The
Nile, the second longest river in the world, traverses nine countries: Egypt, Sudan,
Ethiopia, Zaire, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. See Charles 0.
Okidi, Legal and Policy Regime of Lake Victoria and Nile Basins, 20 INDIAN J. INT'L L.
395, 395 (1980).
2. See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the work of its Forty-Ninth Session, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 199, at art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/49/10
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 ILC Report]. Article 2(a) of the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles
defines international watercourse as "a watercourse, parts of which are situated in
different States .... ." Id. at art. 2(a). A watercourse is "a system of surface and
underground waters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary
whole and flowing into a common terminus." Id. at art. 2(b); see alsoJ.G. LxAm
s,
PoLiUToN OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 18-19 (1984). Lammers defines an
international watercourse as "any river - including the eventual estuary up to the
baseline from which the territorial sea is measured - lake or canal which separates
or passes through the territories of two or more States." Id. This definition is
similar to the definition in Article 1 of the 1974 Draft European Convention and
the 1980 Draft European Convention. See id. at 19 n.1.
The system of waters crossing national boundaries are known as international
drainage basins. See The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of InternationalRivers, art.
II, Int'l L. Assoc., Rep. of the 52d Conf., adopted at Helsinki, Aug. 20, 1966 [hereinafter Helsinki Rules]. An international drainage basin is "a geographical area extending over two or more States determined by the watershed limits of the system
of waters, including surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus." Id. Lammers defines the waters of an international drainage basin as "the
interconnected system of rivers, lakes, canals or marshes, etc., the waters of which
tend to flow into a common terminus and which extends over two or more States."
LAmsns, supra, at 19. The drainage basin concept includes "the diffused surface
water and groundwater which flows into the common terminus." Id. Lammers
based this definition on the following three sources: (1) Helsinki Rules, art. II;
LuwiK A. TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAw 7-14 (The Hague:
Nijhoff, 1967); (2) Fresh Water Pollution Control in Europe 26-28, Council of Europe Doc. 1965 (1966); and (3) Encyclopedia Britannica. See id. at 20 n.1.
The concepts of international watercourses and international drainage basins
are similar but not identical. For example, the concept of the international water-
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The use of an international watercourse is a declaration of
State sovereignty under customary international law.3 Under principles of customary international law, a State has the power to regulate its own natural resources through domestic legislation. 4 A
State can regulate water within its territory to provide optimum dis5
tribution for human, environmental and technological needs.
course would not cover pollution resulting from the discharge of pollutants in
many States that were not riparian to the same international watercourse. See id. at
20-21. A State is riparian if water flows through it or across it. SeeJoseph W. Dellepenna, Treaties as Instruments for Managing Internationally-SharedWater Resources:
Restricted Sovereignty vs. Community of Prperty, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27, 35
(1994) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments]. The concept of the international drainage basin would cover this situation because it applies to the pollution of the whole interconnected water system and not just to a single river. See
LAMMERS, supra, at 19.
3. See Indus Waters Treaty, Sept. 19, 1960, Pak.-India, art. XI(2), 419 U.N.T.S.
125 (1962). Sovereignty is defined as "freedom from external control." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNAIONAL DICTIONARY 2179 (16th ed. 1971). State sovereignty
means that every State is entitled to exercise exclusive jurisdiction within its own
territory. See ALEXANDRE Kiss & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENmomsr'rAL

LAw 119 (1991). A State is free to regulate its own natural resources without associating another State. See Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), 12 R.IA.A.
281 (1957). When a State uses an international watercourse, it essentially claims its
right to use its territory independent of other States. See id.
4. The United Nations Charter and principles of international law give States
"the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies...." Xue Hanqin, Relativity in International Water Law, 3 CoLo. J.
INT'L ENvr-L. L. & POL'Y 45, 51 (1992) (citing Stockholm Declaration on the
Human Environment, Principle 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972), reprinted in
11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]). See Lake Lanoux Arbitration, supra note 3, at 281 (holding that State has right to initiate development
of its own natural resources).
In the United States, the federal government has the ability to regulate the
nation's waters through its Commerce Clause powers. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3. Because the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, Congress can regulate all waters that are susceptible to use in interstate or
foreign commerce. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1996). For example, in 1972, the
United States Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA). See Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
(1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994)). The CWA was
designed to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
5. See generally Kevin P. Scanlan, Note, The InternationalLaw Commission'sFirst
Ten Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses:
Do They Adequately Address All the Major Issues of Water Usage in the Middle East?, 19
FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 2180, 2180-87 (1996) (describing uses and importance of
water). Generally worldwide, agricultural use accounts for 69% of withdrawal from
renewable freshwater supplies, while industry and energy production account for
23% and household use only accounts for 8%. See LeRoy, supra note 1, at 303
(citing REsouRcES 1992-93, supra note 1, at 328-29). However, water use varies
according to a State's economic development, climate and population size. See id.
For example, industry and energy production claim less than 5% of the freshwater
use in many developing countries but claim 85% of freshwater use in developed
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Although States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources, they also have the responsibility to ensure that actions
taken within their national boundaries do not injure the environment of other States. 6 Because the use of international waters in
one State affects the quality and quantity of water in another, regulation of the use of water is essential to minimize injury to all States
7
sharing a water supply.
States regulate international watercourses through bilateral
and multilateral agreements. 8 Because all watercourses have their
countries such as Belgium and France. See id. (citing RESOURCES 1992-93, supra
note 1, at 328-29).
6. See Hanqin, supranote 4, at 51 (citing Stockholm Declaration, supra note 4,
at Principle 21). Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration declares that:
[s]tates have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principle of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 4, at 1420. The right of a sovereign State to use
its natural resources must be balanced with man's right to live in an environment
of a "quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being .... " Id. at 1417. States
should not enact environmental policies that "hamper the attainment of better
living conditions for all .

. . ."

Id. at 1419.

7. See Hanqin, supra note 4, at 47; Ludwik A. Teclaff, Fiator Custom: The Checkered Development of International Water Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 45, 45-46 (1991)
[hereinafter CHECKERED DEVELOPMENT]. In an interdependent water system, damage done to water at one point is naturally carried to other points. See Teclaff,
supra, at 45. An example of this is the Rhine River "where 'waste salts from the
Alsatian region in France, industrial pollution from around Basel in Switzerland,
and German industry in the various tributaries of the Rhine.. .' all have become a
critical problem of the Netherlands and Belgium." Charles 0. Okidi, "Preservation
and Protection" Under the 1991 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of International Watercourses, 3 COLO.J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & PoL'Y 143, 147 (1992) (citing Robert E. Stein,
The Potentialof Regional Organizationsin ManagingMan's Environment, in LAw, INSTiTULrIONS, AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 253, 265 (John Lawrence Hargrove ed.,
1972)).

A State that builds a dam within its own territory can cause damage to the
environment of other States. See id. A dam constructed in a downstream State can
cause a backwater effect resulting in the flooding of an upstream State. See id. For
example, the Aswan High Dam in Egypt created a backwater effect which flooded
Wadi Halfa in Sudan. See id. Moreover, the increased use of water at one point of
an interdependent water system necessarily decreases the possible use of water at
other locations. See U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMICS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL WATER RESOURCES: INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS at
12, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/5, U.N. Sales No. E.75.IIA2 (1975).
8. See IAMMRS, supra note 2, at 362-63. States are:
expected to negotiate with one another agreements - sometimes on the
basis of certain general concepts such as, e.g., "sovereign equality", "mutual interest", "respect for the interests of the other riparian State" or "the
coherence of the waters" - thereby laying down the rights and duties of
the riparian States while taking into account the circumstances of each
particular case.
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own unique attributes, a universal set of mandatory watercourse
rules could not encompass the needs of all of the States sharing
such watercourses. 9 Thus, states require the freedom to craft their
own agreements which can be tailored to individual watercourses. 10
To provide States with guidelines for forming their own agreeId.
States have developed more than 300 treaties which specifically regulate international water uses and 2,000 treaties which have some provisions related to water
use. See LeRoy, supra note 1, at 319. States have also formed commissions to manage international watercourses. See id. at 320-21. For example, the United States
formed joint commissions to settle water disputes with its neighboring States. See
id. Specifically, the United States and Canada formed the International Joint Commission (IJC) in 1909, and the United States and Mexico formed the International
Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) in 1945. See id. at 320-21 & n.77. For a
full discussion of the IBWC, see Stephen P. Mumme & Scott T. Moore, Agency
Autonomy in Transbounday Resource Management: The United States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 661 (1990).
9. See BONAYA ADHi GODANA, AnucA's SHARED WATER REsoUxRCES 66 (1985).
International watercourses have characters of their own. See id. Each international
watercourse crosses different forms of land in different nations and vary in shape,
length, width and depth. See id. The Danube River represents a unique international watercourse. See id. The Danube is over 2,850 kilometers in length and
constitutes the second largest river in Europe. See Joanne Linnerooth, The Danube
River Basin: Negotiating Settlements to TransboundaryEnvironmentalIssues, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 629, 631 (1990). The Danube crosses through many States including
West Germany, Austria, former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, former Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and the former Soviet Union. See id. The following description of
the Danube River clearly displays the intricacies of international watercourses:
[n] ear its source, the Danube has the character of a mountain river flowing through West Germany and Austria (passing Regensburg and Vienna) into [former] Czechoslovakia, where at Bratislava it forms the
border between [former] Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Flowing south
through the Great Hungarian Plain (passing Budapest), it turns eastward
into [former] Yugoslavia, (passing Belgrade) and later forms the border
between [former] Yugoslavia and Rumania with the famous narrows at
the Iron Gate. The lower, marshy section of the river serves again as a
geographic boundary on the long stretch between Rumania and Bulgaria,
where shortly before the Black Sea it separates Rumania and the former
Soviet Union, and empties into a spectacular delta.
Id.
10. See Godana, supra note 9, at 66. In forming international agreements,
States need leeway to utilize different concepts to adapt to the different factual
contexts that watercourses present. See Hanqin, supra note 4, at 49. A spokesperson from Austria commented on the importance of individually tailoring agreements by stating that:
the treaties on water management concluded by Austria with the neighboring States are drafted in terms of border watercourses rather than geographical or hydrological drainage areas. Similarly, the Draft European
convention for the protection of international watercourses against pollution ...

has to be restricted to "international watercourses" because of

legal, practical and political difficulties.
Id. at 49 (quoting [1976] 2(1) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n at 152, 158, 159, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/294). For additional examples of varying concepts of watercourses, see id. at
n.12 and supra note 2.
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ments, the International Law Association (ILA) and the International Law Commission (ILG) studied the aspects of international
watercourse law."
The ILA, a non-governmental association, produced the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (Helsinki Rules or Rules) in 1966.12 These Rules provide
comprehensive guidelines for the regulation of watercourses; however, the Rules lack enforcement power, because the ILA is a nongovernmental agency.1 3 The ILC, an organ of the United Nations,
developed the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1994 U.N. Draft Articles or Articles).14 These Articles provide a potential framework for
all States to follow when regulating international watercourses, but
the Articles' fate is undetermined because the United Nations has
yet to act on them.1 5
This Note highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the Helsinki Rules and the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles. Part II of this Note
sets forth the principles of customary international law of shared
watercourses.16 Part III gives a brief background on the ILA's con-

11. See Stephen McCaffrey, InternationalOrganizationsand the Holistic Approach
to Water Problems, 31 NAT. REsouxcEs J. 139, 141 (1991) [hereinafter McCaffrey
Holistic Approach to Water Aroblems]; Stephen C. McCaffrey, Introduction to InternationalLaw Commission Report on the Draft Articles, 30 I.L.M. 1554, 1555 (1991) [hereinafter McCaffrey, Report on the DraftArtides].
12. See McCaffrey, Holistic Approach to Water Problems, supra note 11, at 141; see
(generally) Helsinki Rules, supra note 2. For a discussion of the development of the
Helsinki Rules, see infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
13. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structures of Water Management Needed to Fulfill the Israeli-PalestinianDeclarationof Pinciples,7 PAIESTNE Y.B. OF
INT'L L. 63, 80 (1992/1994) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Designingthe Legal Structures].
14. See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments,supra note 2, at 38; see also 1994 ILC
Report, supra note 2. For a discussion of the development of the 1994 U.N. Draft
Articles, see infra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
15. See Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/52 (1994). The General Assembly intended that:
at the beginning of its fifty-first session of the General Assembly, the Sixth
Committee shall convene as a working group of the whole, open to States
Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies, for
three weeks from 7 to 25 October, 1996 to elaborate a framework convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses
on the basis of the draft articles adopted by the International Law Commission in the light of the written comments and observations of States
and views expressed in the debate at the forty-ninth session ....
Id.
16. For a discussion of the principles of customary international law of shared
watercourses, see infra notes 21-52 and accompanying text.
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tributions to international watercourse law. 17 Next, Part IV outlines
the ILC's progress on international watercourse law.18 Part V provides a comparison between the Helsinki Rules and the 1994 U.N.
Draft Articles, and Part VI engages in critical analysis of their underlying provisions. 19 Finally, Part VII concludes with an analysis of the
Helsinki Rules and the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles and the potential
impact that the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles could have on the interna20
tional community

II.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SHARED WATERCOURSES

A. Claims Regarding International Watercourses
Since ancient times, civilizations have struggled to control
water supplies and overcome disputes regarding shared watercourses.2 1 Throughout the centuries, civilizations have claimed the
right to use watercourses which are found entirely within their territory or which traverse their national boundaries. 2 2 Unfortunately,
the ideal use of a watercourse by one State often clashes with an17. For a discussion of the ILA's contributions to international watercourse
law, see infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the ILC's progress on international watercourse law,
see infra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
19. For a comparison of the Helsinki Rules and the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles,
see infra notes 78-157 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of their provisions, see infra notes 158-208 and accompanying text.
20. For the final analysis and the impact that the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles
could potentially have on the international community, see infra notes 209-24 and
accompanying text.
21. SeeEyal Benvenisti, CollectiveAction in the Utilizationof SharedFreshwater: The
Challenges of International Water Resources Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 384, 385 (1996).
Civilizations have recognized that water is an essential element for the advancement of society. See Lmas V. CUNHA ET AL., MANAGEMAENT AND LAW FOR WATER

REsouRcEs 10 (1977). "In all great ancient societies, Sumer and Assyria in Mesopotamia, pharaonic Egypt, the Inca Empire of Peru, and China and India, the
taming of rivers was the catalyst of their evolution." Benvenisti, supra, at 385.
"(T]he harnessing of rivers for large-scale irrigation" brought about "the emergence of highly developed, centrally controlled communites." Id. (citing KARL A.
Wr-rroGEL. OpImNTAL DEsPoTIsM: A ComnARATvE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER 8

(1957)). Other examples of early civilizations utilizing rivers include the ancient
societies of the Nile, Tigris-Euphrates and Yellow Rivers who manipulated water
flow for agricultural purposes. See TEcLIF, supra note 2, at 15-23.
22. See LeRoy, supra note 1, at 300. States have engaged in both regional and
international disputes involving water sources. See id. For example, domestic tension has arisen in the United States between urban and agricultural water users.
See id. at 316. Furthermore, international conflicts over water sources have occurred frequently in the Middle East. See generally Sharif S. Elmusa, Dividing Common Water Resources According to InternationalWater Law: The Case of the PalestinianIsraeli Waters, 35 NAT. REsouRcEsj. 223 (1995) (describing Palestinian-Israeli conflict over reallocation of water rights).
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other State's ideal use of that same watercourse. 23 These clashes of
ideals have brought about conflict between States in their struggle
24
for the use of water supplies.
States have relied on various principles to claim their rights to
a water supply.2 5 Over the years, these principles have formed the
customary international law of watercourses.2 6 Customary international law develops from consistent state practice performed out of
a sense of legal obligation (opiniojuris).27 States operate through a
23. See Scanlan, supra note 5, at 2194-2201 (discussing tension arising from
shared watercourses in the Middle East). For example, Turkey, Syria and Iraq have
all developed ambitious plans for the use of the Euphrates River. See id. at 2198
(citingJohnathan E. Cohen, Note, InternationalLaw and the WaterPolitics of the Euphrates, 24 N.Y.UJ. INT'L L. & POL. 502, 507 (1991); John Kolars, Problems of International River Management: The Case of the Euphrates, in INTERNATIONAL WATERS OF

48, 83-84 (Asit K. Biswas ed., 1994)). The initiation of all of these
plans would require 1.4 times the average flow of the river. See id (citing American
TmE MIDDLE EAST

Society of International Law, Water Resources in the Middle East: Impact on Economics and Politics, Proceedings of the 80th Annual Meeting 249, 255 (1986)).
In 1973, Turkey built the Keban Dam while Syria built the Tabqa Dam. See id.
(citing Aaron T. Wolf, A HydropoliticalHistory of the Nide, Jordan and Euphrates River
Basins, in INTERNATIONAL WATERS OF THE MIDDLE EAST: FROM EUPHRATES-TIGis TO
NILE 20, 29 (Asit K. Biswas ed., 1994)). These two dams reduced the flow of the
river into Iraq by 80%. See id. at 2199 (citing WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CONFLICT
OR COOPERATION? 83, 93-94 (Thomas Naff & Ruth C. Matson eds., 1984) [hereinafter WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST]).
24. For example, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria have been in
constant conflict over their rights to the Jordan River Valley. See Dellapenna, supra
note 13, at 63-64. Controversy also reigns between France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany who continuously argue over pollution in the Rhine River.
See LeRoy, supra note 1, at 317.
25. See generally Tedaff, CHECKERED DEvELoPMENT, supra note 7 (describing
development of principles of international watercourse law). For a discussion of
the principles of international watercourse law, see infra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.

26. See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supra note 2, at 33-34. For a discussion of the acceptance or rejection of watercourse principles by the international
community, see infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
27. See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments,supra note 2, at 33. Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice recognizes "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law .... " Statute of the International
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 3 Bevans 1179. For
State practice to become international law, States must follow the practice out of a
sense of legal obligation. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHnjm, R. TRMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (2d ed. 1995) (citing RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. c (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMzNT]).
In other words, the "[r] ecurrence of the usage or practice tends to develop an
expectation that, in similar future situations, the same conduct or the abstention
therefrom will be repeated." Id. at 144. When the expectation becomes both a
right and an obligation acknowledged by States, it has achieved the status of international law. See id. If States follow a practice but feel legally free to disregard the
practice, the practice does not constitute international law. See id. at 146 (citing
RESTATEMENT § 102 cmt. c). For a discussion of the concept of opinio juris,see Jo
Lynn Slama, OpinioJuris in Customary InternationalLaw, 15 OKLA. Crly U. L. REv.
603 (1990).
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process of claim and counterclaim. 28 The only unanimously accepted claim of States regarding shared watercourses is that riparian States alone enjoy the legal right to use the water of a
watercourse.
Other claims and counterclaims that States assert often depend
upon the geographical position of the riparian State along the watercourse.30 Upper riparian States can assert a claim of "absolute
territorial sovereignty."3 ' These upper States claim they can use a
watercourse in any manner regardless of the effect that their conduct has on other riparian States.3 2 In response, lower riparian
28. See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supra note 2, at 33-34. Customary
international law "is a constantly evolving process created by claim and counterclaim." William L. Schachte, Jr., National Secunty: Customary InternationalLaw and
the Convention on Law of the Sea, 7 GEo. INT'L ENvL. L. REV. 709, 711 (1995). For
example, competing desires of claim and counterclaim developed the law of the
sea. See William J. Aceves, The Freedom of NavigationProgram:A Study of the Relationship Between Law and Politics, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp.L. Rxv. 259, 262 (1996).
The concept of State exercise of authority over the seas dashed with the competing concept of freedom of the seas. See id. These two concepts evolved into international principles that govern the law of the sea. See id.
29. See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supra note 2, at 35. If all of the
affected riparian States consent, a non-riparian State may also use the water of a
watercourse. See id. For a discussion of the conflicting claims of States regarding
international watercourses, see infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
30. See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supra note 2, at 35. Neighboring
riparian States have conflicting interests based on their geographical position. See
Hanqin, supra note 4, at 47. Upstream riparian States will claim that they can use
the river however they chose, and downstream riparian States will claim that upstream States cannot alter the quantity or quality of the water. See Dellapenna,
Treaties as Instruments, supra note 2, at 35-36. Because neither State will accept the
position of the other, the interests of the geographically advantaged upstream
States must be balanced against the interests of the disadvantaged downstream
States. See Hanqin, supra note 4, at 47.
31. See Hanqin, supra note 4, at 48. This concept is also known as the Harmon
Doctrine. See KIsS & SHELTON, supra note 3, at 119. In 1895, then U.S. Attorney
General J. Harmon introduced the Harmon Doctrine during a dispute between
the United States and Mexico over the diversion of water from the Rio Grande
River. See 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274-83 (1898). Harmon argued that as an upper riparian State, the United States had no obligation to Mexico under international law.
See id. However, subsequent action by Attorneys General "reflects greater considerations for the Mexican side of this controversy." DAVID R. DEENER, THE UNrTED
STATES ATroRNEYS GENERAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 257 (1957).

32. See LAMMERS, supra note 2, at 361. Riparian States always try to utilize
great amounts of water from a watercourse to exercise autonomy over its management. SeeJ. BRuIAcS, THE LAW OF NoN-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL WA-

TERcOuRSEs 42 (1993). For example, in 1965, the Arab States commenced
construction of a water project which would divert the flow of water to Israel by
35% because they wished to seize control of the Jordan River. See Wolf, supra note
23, at 20. Israel regarded this as an intrusion of its sovereignty and attacked the
Arab States' waterworks. See id. at 25-26. Tension between Israel and the Arab
States eventually escalated to war in 1967 which resulted in Israel obtaining control
of the West Bank. See id. at 26, 31.
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States may assert a claim of "absolute territorial integrity."33 These
lower States claim that a riparian State may not develop a portion of
a watercourse if that development will alter the quality or quantity
34
of the water available to other riparian States.
The concept of "restricted sovereignty" represents the equilibrium between these two adverse claims.3 5 This concept encompasses the theory of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedaswhich permits
a State to use a resource within its territory so long as the use does
not injure another State.3 6 "Restricted sovereignty" attempts "to
avoid conflict by allocating available water among the several riparian states . . .- 3
33. See Hanqin, supra note 4, at 48. This theory is also known as "absolute
integrity of the river." See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supra note 2, at 35.
This Note will refer to the theory as "absolute territorial integrity." "Absolute territorial integrity" supports the view that a State does not have to accept any detrimental change to its water regime, no matter how small the alteration. See
LAMMERs, supra note 2, at 361.
34. See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supranote 2, at 35-36. States do not
generally accept this theory. See LAkMM.Rs, supra note 2, at 361. The 1933 Montevideo Declaration utilized the concept of "absolute territorial integrity" by requiring the prior consent of riparian States when injurious alterations to water sources
were involved. See id. at 361-62. See Seventh International Conference of American
States, Plenary Sessions, Minutes and Antecedents, Montevideo, 1933, at 114.
However, this Declaration was based on doctrinal views and not on State practice.
See id. at 362.
Two additional examples of the concept of "absolute territorial integrity" are
Bolivia and Austria's claims made during disputes with neighboring States. See id.
at 228, 289. In 1939, a dispute arose between Chile and Bolivia over the use of
water of the Rio Lauca which flowed from Chile to Bolivia. See id. at 289. Chile, an
upper riparian state, planned to divert water from the Rio Lauca to irrigate the
Valley ofAzapa. See id. Bolivia, a lower riparian State claimed that Chile could not
do this, because the action would diminish Bolivia's water supply. See id.
In 1907, Austria wanted to divert the waters of several watercourses flowing
into Bavaria for power production purposes. See id. at 228. Austria claimed that it
could use the water in its territory in any manner. See id. Conversely, Bavaria
claimed that Austria had to refrain from doing anything that would affect the quality or quantity of water available to it. See id.
35. See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supra note 2, at 36. The terms "restricted territorial sovereignty" and "restricted territorial integrity" are hybrids of
the concepts of "absolute territorial sovereignty" and "absolute territorial integrity." See GODANA, supra note 9, at 40.
36. See Chapman v. Bennett, 169 N.E.2d 212, 214 (Ind.1960) (defining term
as common law maxim meaning "use your own property as not to injure others").
Some scholars believe that a State is allowed to use a watercourse which causes
some harm to other States as long as the harm is not substantial. See LAMMERS,
supranote 2, at 571. Substantial harm is something more than minor and insignificant harm. See id. at 363.
37. Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supranote 2, at 37-38. River water must
be allocated between riparian States to balance the conflicting interests of maintaining the river, maintaining and expanding the navigable waterway, assuring an
adequate supply of water, protecting the water quality, preventing floods and preserving the river and its surroundings. See Linnerooth, supra note 9, at 633. One
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In addition to claims based on geographical position, States
sometimes claim that they have the right to use a watercourse in a
particular way in light of the time at which they commenced a particular use.38 This principle, known as "prior appropriation," ignores the status of States on the watercourse and focuses on which
State first initiated its use of the watercourse.3 9 "Prior appropriation" protects "fully the use which existed priorin time."4° However,
the principle only regulates the quantity of water actually used by a
State and does not refer to the harm that a State may cause by di41
verting water from the watercourse.
B.

Internationally Accepted Principles

The concepts of "absolute territorial sovereignty" and "absolute territorial integrity" are not generally accepted norms of customary international law.42 Rather, the international community as
way of balancing State interests is through the process of equitable utilization. See
GODANA, supra note 9, at 50-51. Equitable utilization requires States to consider
and evaluate the interests of the users of a watercourse to produce an equitable
solution for all. See id. at 50, 55. For further discussion of equitable utilization, see
infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
38. See UmmERs, supranote 2, at 364. States justify their claims on the proposition that "the water in the rivers is not sufficient to meet the needs of all the
riparians." GODANA, supra note 9, at 53. Because there is not enough water for all
States to use as they please, riparian States argue that "he who first invests labor in
a stream deserves its benefits." Id. at 53 (quoting S.C. Agrawal, Legal Aspects of the
Indo-Pakistan Water Dispute, 21 Sup. Or. OF INDIAJ. 157, 167 (1958)).
39. See GODANA, supra note 9, at 52. This concept is also known as "the principle of prior use." See LAmWExs, supra note 2, at 364. This Note will refer to the
principle as "prior appropriation." "Prior appropriation" holds that "no type of use
is inherently superior to any other type of use in case of a conflict between water
uses." LAmmEis, supranote 2, at 364. Whoever first uses a watercourse acquires a
vested right of use. See GODANA, supra note 9, at 52. This is often "highly inequitable for a riparian State in which the exploitation of the water resources has, for
reasons beyond its power, lagged behind." LMmis, supra note 2, at 364.
40. LAMMzRs, supra note 2, at 364. If a State develops different uses of a watercourse at different periods of time, some of the uses may be protected by "prior
appropriation" and some may not, depending on their places on the time scale.
See id.
41. See id For example, the principle of "prior appropriation" does not answer the question of what happens when a State's water diversion harms the natural vegetation of another State by lowering the water level, because there exists no
"actual use of a certain quantity of water which has started at a given point of time."
Id.
42. See id. at 362; Hanqin, supra note 4, at 48. The two extreme positions of
"absolute territorial sovereignty" and "absolute territorial integrity" never received
general recognition in the international community. See Hanqin, supra note 4, at
48. "Absolute territorial integrity" did not receive support in the international
community, because practice of the theory unfairly burdens upper riparian States
without placing a similar burden on downstream riparian States. See GODANA,
supra note 9, at 38-39. According to Godana, the principle is acceptable only when
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a whole has moved away from reinforcing the absolute interests of
States and towards the balancing of interests. 43 "Restricted sovereignty" is a generally accepted norm of customary international law
which aims at striking a balance between conflicting State
interests. 4
Furthermore, State practice reveals that the concept of "restricted sovereignty" usually trumps the principle of "prior appropriation." 45 Thus, used alone, "prior appropriation" is not a
generally accepted principle of international law. 6 However, a

the lower riparian State depends on the continued flow of water for its survival. See
id. at 39.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has rejected the principle of
"absolute territorial integrity," because it would allow downstream States to exercise complete control over water sources. See Scanlan, supranote 5, at n.246 (citing
Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943); NewJersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342
(1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669-70 (1931)). Additionally,
the United States also withdrew support from the principle of "absolute territorial
sovereignty" when it reanalyzed the Harmon Doctrine. See DE.NER, supra note 31,
at 257. For a discussion of the Harmon Doctrine, see supra note 31. This absolute
principle was generally rejected because it offers no legal solutions capable of
resolving disputes between two States who maintain opposing views. See Kiss &
SHELTON, supra note 3, at 120.
Although some States used the concepts of "absolute territorial sovereignty"
and "absolute territorial integrity" in forming international watercourse agreements, the States do not claim that they are following accepted principles of customary international law. See LAMMF.Ss, supra note 2, at 362. For example,
"absolute territorial integrity" was used in the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom on behalf of Sudan. See id. at 362. However, the drafters of the Agreement did not claim that the concepts within the
Agreement were based on accepted principles of international law. See id. Moreover, the concept was excluded from the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between
Egypt and Sudan. See id.
43. See Hanqin, supra note 4, at 47. The utter incompatibility of the claims of
"absolute territorial sovereignty" and "absolute territorial integrity" ensures that
these claims will never receive wide acceptance and suggests that the balancing of
interests is an acceptable equitable solution. See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments,
supra note 2, at 36. The balancing of interests and the general cooperation between States has successfully allowed States to conclude hundreds of international
conventions on water use. See Hanqin, supra note 4, at 47.
44. See LAmNmRs, supra note 2, at 371; Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments,supra
note 2, at 37-38. Dellapenna states that restricted sovereignty has become the customary international law of international watercourses. See Dellapenna, Treaties as
Instruments, supra note 2, at 36-37.
45. See LAMMERS, supa note 2, at 366-67. Although a few countries support
the theory of "prior appropriation," "States in general have . . . expressed themselves in favour of an approach which stipulates the equitable utilization of the
waters of an intemationai watercourse." Id. at 367.
46. See id. at 366. Although the principle of "prior appropriation" was used in
the 1929 Nile Water Agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom, the
drafters of the Agreement did not claim that such reliance was based on generally
recognized principles of international law. See id.
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State may use "prior appropriation" in conjunction with "restricted
47
sovereignty" as an alternative application of these two theories.
C.

Codification of Customary International Law of Shared
Watercourses

Several legal organizations have attempted to codify the customary international law of watercourses. 48 In 1966, the ILA developed the Helsinki Rules.4 9 The Helsinki Rules illustrate the first
attempt to codify the entire law of international watercourses. 5 0
Following the path of the ILA, the ILC completed a set of Draft
Articles on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water47. See id. at 303-04 (describing how Iran "adhered to the principle of 'prior
appropriation' as far as existing water uses were concerned and to the principle of
equitable apportionment in respect of the surplus waters" remaining after States
received their traditional quantity of water); Helsinki Rules, supranote 2, at arts. V,
VIII (describing priority given to existing reasonable uses when balancing the interests of States); Benvenisti, supra note 21, at 408-09 (describing priority of existing reasonable uses in Helsinki Rules). For a discussion of the coupling of the
theory of "restricted sovereignty" with the theory of "prior appropriation," see infra
notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
48. Early efforts included the Resolution on Principles of Law Governing the
Uses of International Rivers and Lakes created by the Inter-American Bar Association in 1957. See Inter-American Bar Ass'n, Resolution on Principles of Law Governing the Uses of International Rivers and Lakes (1957). The Institute of
International Law adopted the 1961 Salzburg Resolution on the Use of International Non-Maritime Waters. See Institut de Droit International, Salzburg Session,
adopted at Basel, Sept. 1961, 49 Annuaire Inst. Droit Int'l 381. The Institute of
International Law also adopted the 1979 Athens Resolution on the Pollution of
Rivers and Lakes and International Law. See Institut de Droit International, Resolution on Pollution of Rivers and Lakes, 59th Sess., adopted at Athens, 1979, 58
Annuaire Inst. Droit Int'l 196.
The U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) adopted the "Declaration
of Policy on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, Including Transboundary
Pollution." See Decision B (XXXV), adopted at the 35th Sess. (1980), in Economic
Comm'n for Europe, Two Decades of Co-Operation on Water, U.N. Doc. ECE/
ENVWA/2, at 1, 3 (1988). This document only "indicates that 'rational utilization
of water resources' is a basic element of long-term water management." Dellapenna, Desgning the Legal Structure, supra note 13, at 81. The ECE also adopted
the "Declaration of Policy on the Rational Use of Water." See Decision C (XXXIX),
adopted at the 35th Sess. (1980), in Economic Comm'n for Europe, Two Decades
of Co-Operation on Water, U.N. Doc. ECE/ENVWA/2, at 12, 15 (1988). The document "recommends a 'unified strategy' and 'coordinated utilization.'" See Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structures, supra note 13, at 81. In addition, the ECE
also adopted "Recommendations to ECE Governments on Long Term Planning of
Water Management." See Economic Comm'n for Europe, Two Decades of Co-Operation on Water, U.N. Doc. ECE/ENVWA/2, at 39, 41 (1988). The recommendations "endorse basin-wide, cooperative management of shared water resources."
Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structures, supra note 13, at 81.
49. See Dellapenna, Designingthe Legal Structures, supra note 13, at 80; see generally Hesinki Rules, supra note 2.
50. See Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structures, supra note 13, at 80.
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courses in 1991 (1991 U.N. Draft Articles). 5 ' Because the 1991
U.N. Draft Articles provoked significant controversy in the international community, the ILC revised them in July 1994, thus producing the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles. 52
III.

INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION'S DEvELoPMENT OF THE
LAw OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES

The IA is a highly respected organization of legal experts that
was established in 1873. 5 3 The ILA initiated the development of
the law of international water resources almost forty years ago. 54 In

1954, the ILA established the Committee on the Uses of Waters of
International Rivers (Rivers Committee).55 The Rivers Committee
performed "the best-known study of the customary international
law of transboundary water resources" which resulted in the 1966
adoption of the Helsinki Rules.
Nevertheless, the adoption of the Helsinki Rules did not terminate the work of the ILA on the law of international water resources. 5 7 Before the Helsinki Conference concluded, the Rivers
51. See id. at 81; Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its FortyThird Session, UN GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 161, U.N. Doc. A/46/10
(1991), availabein [19911 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 66 [hereinafter 1991 1LC Report].
For the text of the Draft Articles, see 3 CoLO. J. INT'L ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 1 (1992).
52. See Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structures,supra note 13, at 84; 1994 ILC
Report, supra note 2. The 1991 U.N. Draft Articles "provoked considerable controversy both among the foreign ministries of member states of the United Nations
and among the 'well-qualified publicists' who had worked on this topic." Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structur, supra note 13, at 84. The ILC thus "considerably revised" the 1991 U.N. Draft Articles in developing the 1994 U.N. Draft
Articles. See id. For a discussion of the controversy and the changes made to the
1991 U.N. Draft Articles, see infra notes 116-37 and accompanying text.
53. See Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structures, supra note 13, at 80.
54. See Tm WoRK OF THE INTERNATIoNAL LAW ASSOCIATION ON THE LAW OF

INTERNATIONAL WATER RESOURCES 13 (E.J. Manner & Veli-Martii Metsalampi eds.,

Helsinki 1988) [hereinafter WORK OF THE IA]. When the ILA began to develop
the law, it was responding to concerns over serious international river disputes,
especially the ones "between India and Pakistan over the Indus, between Egypt and
the Sudan over the Nile, between Israel and its neighbors over the Jordan, and
between Canada and the United States over the Columbia." Charles B. Bourne,
The InternationalLaw Association's Contributionto InternationalWater Resources Law, 36
NAT. REsouRcEsJ. 155, 156 (1996).

55. See WoRK OF TmE ILA, supra note 54, at 13; Bourne, JLA's Contribution,
supra note 54, at 156.
56. Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structures, supra note 13, at 80.
57. See WORK OF Tm HA, supra note 54, at 13. The Rivers Committee was
aware of "numerous theoretical and practical problems still awaiting international
legal codification" and thus recommended that a new Committee continue the
study of international water resources. See id.
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Committee recommended that the ILA appoint a subsequent
Committee:
to carry on a programme of codification and study of certain selected aspects of water resources law, of which the
following topics are illustrative: underground waters, the
relationship of water to other natural resources, domestic
uses of water, hydraulic uses of water including the generation of power and irrigation, flood control and siltation,
regulation of water flow, detailed rules on the navigation
of rivers, and further consideration of the subject of pollution of coastal areas and enclosed seas. 58
As a result of the Rivers' Committee's recommendation, the ILC
established a new Committee on International Water Resources
Law (Manner Committee) in November 1966. 59 The works crafted
and adopted by the Manner Committee follow the spirit of the Helsinki Rules. 60 States should regard these works "as corollaries to
and clarifications of [the] completions of those Rules."6 1 The current ILA committee, the Committee on International Water Resources (WRC), continues to draft rules to supplement the ILA's
62
work on international watercourse law.

58. Id.
59. See id.; Bourne, LA's Contribution, supra note 54, at 177-78. The Committee is referred to as the Manner Committee, because Dr. E. J. Manner of Finland
urged the establishment of the new committee to consider all of the unfinished
work of the Rivers Committee and then proceeded to chair the committee. See
Bourne, supra note 54, at 177-78.
60. See WoRK OF THE ILA, supra note 54, at 17.
61. Id. Such works include rules on "flood control (1972), pollution (1972
and 1982), navigability (1974), the protection of water installations during armed
conflicts (1976),joint administration (1976 and 1986), flowage regulation (1980),
general environmental management concerns (1980), and groundwater (1986)."
Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structures, supra note 13, at 80-81. For the texts of
these works, see WORK OF ILA, supra note 54, at 33-293.
62. See generally Bourne, ILAs Contribution supra note 54, at 208-13. In 1986,
the Manner Committee concluded its study of the law of international water resources at the 62nd Conference of the International Law Association in Seoul,
South Korea. See WORK OF THE ILA, supra note 54, at 9. In November 1990, the
ILC formed the WRC to consider the "remaining significant problems in the international water resources field .... " Bourne, ILA's Contribution, supra note 54, at
208. The WRC continues to draft additional rules regarding international watercourses. See id. at 208-13. The WRC's latest rules encompass Cross-Media Pollution and Remedies. See id. at 209-12.
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IV.

WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION:

DEVELOPMENT OF THE

1994 U.N.

DRAFT ARTICLES

In 1963, the results of a U.N. study concluded that the world
population could feasibly exceed six billion people by the year
2000.63 Increases in population bring about increased water consumption which in turn depletes States' water supplies.64 The U.N.
was concerned that the increased consumption of water, coupled
with industrial and metropolitan demands on water resources,
would substantially decrease the world's water supply. 65 To address
this concern, in 1970, the U.N. General Assembly gave the ILC6
63. See Scanlan, supra note 5, at 2180 (citing U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMIC
As ASSESSED IN 1963, U.N.

AND SociAL AFFAIRs, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS

Doc. ST/SOA/SER.A/41, U.N. Sales No. 66.XII.2 (1963)). The world population
totaled 5.3 billion people in 1990 and is expected to rise another billion by the
year 2000. See Review of Sectoral Clusters, First Phase: Health, Human Settlements and
Freshwater: Report of the Secretaiy.Genera U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development, 2d Sess., Agenda Item 6, at para. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.17/1994/4 (1994),
available at <gopher://gopher.un.org/00/esc/cn17/1994/off/1994-4> [hereinafter Commission on SustainableDevelopment]. In 1990, 20 countries with a total population of 131 million people experienced water scarcity. See id. Water scarcity is
here defined as per capita availability of freshwater resources of 1,000 cubic meters
or less. See id. By 2010, 26 countries with a population of 416 million people are
expected to suffer from water scarcity. See id.
64. See Commission on SustainableDevelopmen supra note 63, at para. 3 (describing how population increase causes water scarcity).
65. SeeVed P. Nanda, Emerging Trends in the Use of InternationalLaw and Institutions for the Management of International Water Resources, 6 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
239, 239 (1976) (citing Resources and Needs: Assessment of the World Water Situation,
U.N. Water Conference, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.70/CBP/1 (1976) [hereinafter UN.
Assessment of the World Water Situation].) Although the water supply "may be potentially inexhaustible- the future worldwide accelerating demand is likely to strain
water resources not only in several countries but also in several regions of the
world." Id. The 1976 U.N. study "conclude [d] that there exists a potential world
water crisis even though 'globally there may be potentially enough water to meet
forthcoming needs. Frustratingly, it tends to be available in the wrong place, at the
wrong time, or with the wrong quality.'" Id. at 240 (citing U.N. Assessment of the
World Water Situation, supa, at 5). Certain regions suffer from drought while others
are heavily flooded; some regions have enough water in winter but lack a sufficient
supply in summer; and some regions delight in an abundance of water in some
years yet suffer from drought in others. See Benvenisti, supranote 21, at 384. Thus,
the United Nations and many scholars promote the management and redistribution of water in response to water scarcity. See Nanda, supra, at 240; Benvenisti,
supra note 21, at 384.
66. The ILC is an organ of the U.N. designed to promote the "progressive
codification of customary international law." Dellapenna, Designingthe Legal Structures, supra note 13, at 81 (citing THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW CoMMSmSION (4th ed. 1988); Sm IAN SINc.AiR, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION

(1987)). The ILC was established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 174
(11) of November 21, 1947. See International Law Commission Report on the Draft
Articles, 43rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/46/405 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1554, 1564
(1991).
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the responsibility of creating the Draft Articles on the Law of the
67
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.
6
By 1974, the ILC had commenced its preliminary work effort.
In 1991, the ILC adopted the 1991 U.N. Draft Articles and forwarded them to member States for comment.6 9 After receiving and
reviewing the comments of member States and recommendations
of the special rapporteur, the ILC revised the 1991 U.N. Draft Articles. 70 The revision resulted in the adoption of the 1994 U.N. Draft
67. See GA. Res. 2669, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at para. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970). The General Assembly suggested that the ILC "take up the
study of the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses with a
view to its progressive development and codification." Id.
68. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, The InternationalLaw Commission Adopts Draft
Articles on InternationalWatercourses,89 AM. J. INT'L L. 395, 396 (1995) [hereinafter
McCaffrey Commission Adopts Articles]. The ILC had appointed Ambassador Richard
D. Kearney of the United States as the first special rapporteur for the ILC's work
on international watercourses. See id. (citing [1974] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, pt. 1,
at 301, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1974/Add.1 (pt.1)). The Subcommittee established by the ILC sent out a questionnaire to various governments to obtain their
view on "the scope of the proposed study, the uses of water to be considered and
whether the problem of pollution should be given priority, the need to deal with
flood control and erosion problems, and the interrelationship between navigational uses and other uses." Id. For the text of the questionnaire, see [1974] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L.Comm'n, pt. 1, at 303-04, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.1 (pt.1).
Since 1974, the ILC has appointed four successors to the position of special
rapporteur. See McCaffrey, supra, at 396. In 1977, Professor (now Judge) Stephen
M. Schwebel of the United States accepted the position, followed by Ambassador
Jens Evensen of Norway in 1982, Professor Stephen C. McCaffrey of the United
States in 1985, and Professor Robert Rosenstock of the United States in 1992. See
id. at 396 n.9. The changes in special rapporteurship "were unavoidable but undoubtedly delayed the completion of the draft." Id. at 396.
69. See McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note 68, at 397; 1991 LC
Report, supra note 51. The first reading of the Draft Articles contained 32 articles
divided into six parts: Part I, Introduction; Part II, General Principles; Part III,
Planned Measures; Part IV, Protection and Preservation; Part V, Harmful Conditions and Emergency Situations; and Part VI, Miscellaneous Provisions. See McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note 68, at 397; McCaffrey Report on the Draft
Articles, supra note 11, at 1555. The ILC sent the Draft Articles to governments for
comments pursuant to articles 16 and 21 of the ILC Statute. See McCaffrey Report
on the Draft Articles, supra note 11, at 1555. The ILC requested that the governments reply by January 1, 1993, so that it could commence work on the second
reading of the Draft Articles. See id. at 1555-56. For the text of the 1991 Draft
Articles, see 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENrL. L. & POL'Y 1 (1992).
70. See McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note 68, at 397. For the
comments of member States, see The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, Comments and Observations Received From States, U.N. Doc. A/CN/447
and Adds. 1-3 (1993). For the proposals of the special rapporteur, see Robert Rosenstock, First Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/451 (1993); Robert Rosenstock, Second Report on the Law
of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/462
(1994) [hereinafter Rosenstock Second Report].
The role of a special rapporteur is to "mark out and develop the[ topic,
explain the state of the law and make proposals for draft articles." International
Law Commission Report, ch. VII, para. 189 (1997) (last visitedJan. 30, 1997) <http://
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Articles and a resolution on confined transboundary
71
groundwater.
The ILC has not yet completed its work on international watercourses. 7 2 Despite the significant effort that has gone into forming
the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles, the United Nations has not yet proposed them to the international community.7 3 After the ILC
adopted the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles, it turned the Articles over to
the General Assembly to develop a framework convention based on
them.7 4 The Sixth Committee (Legal) of the United Nations Genwww.un.org/plweb-cgi/idoc.p... rg. .80iifi+web+web++watercourses> [hereinafter
Commission Report]. The special rapporteur's responsibilities are:
i. to produce clear and complete articles, as far as possible accompanied
either by commentaries or by notes which could form the basis for
commentaries;
ii. to explain, succinctly, the rationale behind the draft articles currently
before the Drafting Committee, including any changes that may be
indicated;
iii. in the final analysis, to accept the view of the Drafting Committee as a
whole, even if it is contrary to the views advanced by the Special Rapporteur, and as necessary to reflect the view of the Drafting Committee in
revised articles and/or commentary. In performing this function, the
Special Rapporteur should act as servant of the Commission rather than
defender of any personal views avant la letter.
Id. at para. 201.
71. See McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note 68, at 398.
72. See Brief Summary of the Activities of the Sixth Committee (Legal) of the United
Nations General Assembly at Its Fifty-First Session, (last modified November 1, 1996)
<http://www.un.org/law/olacd2.htm> [hereinafter Activities of the Sixth Committee].
The Sixth Committee (Legal) of the United Nations General Assembly has not yet
developed a framework convention for States to follow in forming their own international watercourse agreements. See id. For a discussion of the activities of the
Sixth Committee, see infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
73. See McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note 68, at 395. For a discussion of how the United Nations can propose the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles to the
international community, see infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
74. See McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note 68, at 395. The ILC
completes its task on a given topic when it presents a set of draft articles to the
Sixth Committee. See Commission Report, supra note 70, at para. 183. The purpose
of the ILC is "fully performed if the draft articles and accompanying commentary
articulate the relevant principles in a manner generally suitable for adoption by
States." Id. This determination "is essentially a matter of policy for the Sixth Committee and the member States." Id. When confronted with a set of draft articles,
the Sixth Committee "can merely note the outcome, can deal with it in a preliminary way through a working group or convene a preparatory conference for a similar purpose, can convene a diplomatic conference forthwith, or ... can elect to
deal with the draft articles itself." Id. at para. 184. In the case of the 1994 U.N.
Draft Articles, the Sixth Committee chose to deal with the Articles themselves. See
id. However, under article 23(2) of the Statute, the Sixth Committee can refer the
Draft Articles back to the ILC for reconsideration or redrafting. See id. The ILC
noted that:
if there are serious doubts about the acceptability of any text on a given
subject, it would be helpful if these were made know authoritatively by
the General Assembly and Governments at an earlier stage, rather than
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eral Assembly (Sixth Committee) reviewed the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles from October 7 to October 25, 1996. 75 However, time
constraints did not permit the Sixth Committee to complete a
framework convention based on the Articles. 7 6 Thus, the Sixth
Committee will convene again from March 24 to April 4, 1997 to
77
continue its work in progress.
being postponed or the difficulties shelved until after the Commission
has completed its work and presented it the Sixth Committee.
Id. at para. 185.
75. See Activities of the Sixth Committee, supra note 72. By Resolution 49/52 of
December 9, 1994, the General Assembly requested States to submit their comments on the Draft Articles. See Press Release L/2814, Sixth Committee Working
Group of Whole to ConsiderDraft Articles on International Watercourses (Oct. 7, 1996),
available at <i/idoc.pl?2384+unix+_free user_+www.un.org.80+un+un+pr+pr++intemational%23%26adj%26watercourses%23>. ByJuly 30, 1996, Colombia, Ethiopia, Finland, Guatemala, Hungary, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United States,
Venezuela and Switzerland responded. See id.
In accordance with GA. Res. 49/52, the Sixth Committee (Legal) of the
United Nations General Assembly "convened as a Working Group to elaborate a
framework convention on the non-navigational uses of international watercourses
.... " Activities of the Sixth Committee, supra note 72. During the week of October 7
through October 11, 1996, the Working Group considered articles 1 and 3
through 10. See id. During the week of October 14 through October 18, 1996, the
Working Group continued framing the convention. See id. The main issues discussed during that week were:
(a) the appropriate balance between rights and obligations of watercourse States in the event that one of them implements or permits the
implementation of planned measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse States; (b) protection and preservation of ecosystems; (c) the prevention, reduction and control of
pollution; (d) the prevention of the introduction of alien or new species;
(e) protection and preservation of the marine species; (f) the prevention
and mitigation of harmful conditions; (g) measures to be taken in the
event of emergency situations; (h) international watercourses and installations in time of armed conflict; (i) contacts between watercourse States
in case of serious obstacles; (j) exception of obligation to exchange data
in case of information vital to national defense of security; and (k) the
means of settlement of disputes concerning a question of fact or the interpretation of the Convention.
Id.
During the week of October 21 through October 25, 1996, the Drafting Committee worked out a set of draft articles for articles 1 through 6. See id.; U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/51/NUW/WG/L.1 (1996).
76. See Activities of the Sixth Committee, supra note 72. The Drafting Committee
did not have time to consider article 7 regarding the obligation not to cause significant harm, article 33 regarding the settlement of disputes, the preamble or the
final clauses. See id. Consequently, the Working Group recommended to the General Assembly that the Group convene at a second session to complete the framework convention. See id.
77. See Convention on the Law of the Non-navigationalUses of InternationalWatercourses, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 144, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/206
(1997), available at <gopher://gopher.un.org:70/0O/ga/recs/51/RES51-EN.206>.
[hereinafter Convention on the Law of InternationalWatercourses]. The Sixth Commit-
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COMPARISON OF HELSINKI RULES TO

1994 U.N. DRA'r

ARTICLES

A.

Scope of Helsinki Rules & 1994 U.N. Draft Articles:
Exclusion of Navigation and Confined Groundwater
from 1994 U.N. Draft Articles

The scope of the Helsinki Rules is more expansive than that of
the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles. 78 The Helsinki Rules apply to "the use
of the waters of an international drainage basin except as may be
provided otherwise by convention, agreement or binding custom
among the basin States." 79 The use of waters regulated by the Helsinki Rules includes navigation.8 0 Chapter 4 specifically provides
rules for the use of rivers or lakes which cross national boundaries
and are currently used for, or are capable of being used for, commercial navigation. 8 '
tee noted that it had achieved some progress on the elaboration of a framework
convention but decided that it needed more time to fulfill its mandate. See id.
78. Compare Helsinki Rules, supra note 2, at art. I, and Rules on International
Groundwaters, International Law Association, Report of the Sixty.Second Conference, Seoul 1986, at 21, 231-85 (1986), reprintedinWoRK OF THE ILA, supra note 54,
at 257 [hereinafter Rules on International Groundwaters] (including navigation
and confined groundwater in scope of Helsinki Rules), with 1994 1LC Report, supra
note 2, at arts. 1, 2 (excluding navigation and confined groundwater from scope of
1994 U.N. Draft Articles). For a discussion of the scope of the Helsinki Rules and
the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles, see infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
79. Helsinki Rules, supra note 2, at art. I. The rules are not applicable to the
navigation of vessels of war, vessels performing police or administrative functions
or vessels exercising any other form of public authority. See id at art. XIX. States
subject to these navigational rules are permitted to derogate from the rules in time
of war, armed conflict or public emergency threatening the life of the State as long
as the derogations are consistent with international law. See id. at art. XX.
80. See Helsinki Rules, supra note 2, at art. XII.
81. See id. The text of Article XII reads as follows:
1. This Chapter refers to those rivers and lakes portions of which are
both navigable and separate or traverse the territories of two or more
States.
2. Rivers or lakes are "navigable" if in their natural or canalized state
they are currently used for commercial navigation or are capable by reason of their natural condition of being so used.
3. In this Chapter the term "riparian State" refers to a State through or
along which the navigable portion of a river flows or a lake lies.
Id.
The Helsinki Rules provide that "each riparian State is entitled to enjoy rights
of free navigation on the entire course of a river or lake." Id. at art. XIII. Free
navigation includes:
(a) freedom of movement on the entire navigable course of the river or
lake; (b) freedom to enter ports and to make use of plants and docks;
and (c) freedom to transport goods and passengers, either directly or
through trans-shipment, between the territory of one riparian State and
the terrirory of another riparian State and between the territory of a riparian State and the open sea.
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While the Helsinki Rules encompass navigational rules, the
1994 U.N. Draft Articles specifically exclude them. The 1994 U.N.
Draft Articles apply to "uses of international watercourses and of
their waters for purposes other than navigation and to measures of
conservation related to the uses of those watercourses and their waters."8 2 Article 1 specifically states that navigation falls outside the
83
scope of the Articles.
Furthermore, the Helsinki Rules seek to regulate surface water,
and free groundwater related to surface water and confined
groundwater.8 4 Although the ILC debated whether to include confined or unrelated groundwater within the scope of the 1994 U.N.
Draft Articles, the ILC ultimately decided to exclude it.85 The ILC
Id. at art. XIV. These rights are subject to restrictions set forth in other chapters of
the Helsinki Rules. See id. at art. XIII. For example, the rules of navigation are still
subject to Article X. See id. at arts. X, XII-XX. Specifically, a State can police the
portion of a river located in its jurisdiction but it cannot do anything to cause
substantial injury to other States. See id. at arts. X, XV.
82. 1994 ILCReport, supra note 2, at art. 1(1). The ILC explicitly rejected the
international drainage basin approach taken by the ILA. See Robert D. Hayton,
Observations on the International Law Commission's Draft Rules on the Non-Navigational
Uses ofInternational Watercourses: Articles 1-4, 3 COLO.J. INT'L ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 31,
34-35 (1992). Members of the ILC were disturbed by the "seemingly all-encompassing sweep of the term 'basin.'" Id. at 35. For differences in approach between
the concepts of international watercourses and international drainage basins, see
supra note 2.
83. See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, at art. 1(2). This paragraph states:
"[t]he use of international watercourses for navigation is not within the scope of
the present articles except in so far as other uses affect navigation or are affected
by navigation." Id.
84. See Helsinki Rules, supra note 2, at art. I, II; Rules on International
Groundwaters, supra note 78, at arts. 1, 2. The Helsinki Rules apply to the use of
the waters of an international drainage basin which is defined as a "geographical
area extending over two or more States determined by the watershed limits of the
system of waters, including surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus." Helsinki Rules, supra note 2, at art. II. The ILA's Rules on International Groundwaters are corollaries to and clarifications of the Helsinki Rules.
See WoRK or Tm ILA, supra note 54, at 17. The Rules on International Groundwaters augment the Helsinki Rules and eliminate the requirement that the surface
and underground water be connected. See McCaffrey, Holistic Approach to Water
Proble7s,supra note 11, at 149. Thus, the Helsinki Rules apply to confined groundwater as well as to groundwater connected to surface water. See id.
Surface waters include such water sources as rivers, lakes, ponds and marshes.
See LAwmmRs, supra note 2, at 17. Groundwater is defined as "water within the earth
that supplies wells and springs." WEBSTER'S THmD NEW INmTENATONAL DICTIONARY

1004 (16th ed. 1971). Surface water and groundwater are physically interrelated.
See LAMMERS, supra note 2, at 17. Most groundwater will eventually enter inland
surface waters or discharge directly into the sea. See id. Surface waters seep into
the soil and join underground water. See id. However, part of the underground
water will evaporate into the atmosphere before it ever merges with surface water.
See id.
85. See Summary Records of the Meetings of the Forty-Third Session, [1991] 1 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n, 49, para. 69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1991 [hereinafter 1991
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concluded that the term "watercourse" naturally did not encompass
the term groundwater. 86 Thus, the ILC restricted the scope of the
Articles to free groundwater that was associated with surface
87
water.
The ILC initially took the stance that it must "merely draw the
attention of the international community to the need for an instrument on confined groundwater."8 8 After realizing the importance
of groundwater, however, the ILC adopted a companion resolution
on confined transboundary groundwater in 1994.89 The resolution
suggests that the principles contained in the Articles can be applied
to confined transboundary groundwater; however, the resolution
still fails to require States to apply them. 9°

ILC Y.B.]. During the second reading of the Draft Articles, Professor Rosenstock
proposed that groundwaters be included in the 1994 Draft. See McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note 68, at 403. Relying on a survey of state practice,

Professor Rosenstock concluded: "The recent trend in the managment of water
resources has been to adopt an integrated approach. Inclusion of 'unrelated' confined groundwaters is the bare minimum in the overall scheme of the management of all water resources in an integrated manner." Id. (citing Rosenstock,
Second Report, supra note 70, at 4). Furthermore, the inclusion of groundwaters in
the Draft was important "in order to encourage their management in a rational
manner and prevent their depletion and pollution." Id. (citing Rosenstock, Second
Report supra note 70, at 35). The ILC did not accept this recommendation because
'members generally had not had this form of ground water in mind during the
elaboration of the draft articles." McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note
68, at 402-03.
86. See 1991 ILC Y.B., supra note 85, at 49, para. 69. The ILC reasoned that

the Draft Articles could not be applicable to groundwater because they did not
take into account the special problems of confined groundwater. See id. For a
discussion of some of the problems of confined groundwater, see infta notes 16466 and accompanying text.
87. See 1991 ILC Y.B., supra note 85, at 49, para. 69.
88. Id.
89. See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, at 326. The ILC:

1. Commends States to be guided by the principles contained in the draft
articles on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, where appropriate, in regulating transboundary groundwater;
2. Recommends States to consider entering into agreements with the
other State or States in which the confined transboundary groundwater is
located;
3. Recommends also that, in the event of any dispute involving transboundary confined groundwater, the States concerned should consider
resolving such dispute in accordance with the provisions contained in article 33 of the draft articles, or in such other manner as may be agreed
upon.
Id.
90. See generay McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note 68, at 403.
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Equitable Utilization or Community of Property?

The Helsinki Rules champion the concept of "restricted sovereignty" through equitable utilization. 9 1 According to the Rules,
"[e]ach basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable
and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin." 92 In order to determine whether the
share is "reasonable and equitable," States must weigh various physical, economic and social factors. 95 States must consider the eleven
factors articulated in Article V and reach a conclusion based on the
94
factors as a whole.
The 1994 U.N. Draft Articles also adopt the principle of equitable utilization but lean towards the "community of property" concept 95 The Articles stipulate that watercourse States "shall in their
91. See Hanqin, supra note 4, at 51; Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structures,
supra note 13, at 80 (citing Helsinki Rules, supra note 2, at art. IV). For a discussion of the principle of equitable utilization, see infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
92. Helsinki Rules, supra note 2, at art. IV.
93. See id. at art. V. The eleven factors to be considered include, but are not
limited to the following:
(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the
drainage area in the territory of each basin State; (b) the hydrology of the
basin, including in particular the contribution of water by each basin
State; (c) the climate affecting the basin; (d) the past utilization of the
waters of the basin, including in particular existing utilization; (e) the
economic and social needs of each basin state; (f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin State; (g) the comparative
costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and social needs of
each basin State; (h) the availability of other resources; (i) the avoidance
of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the basin; (j) the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States as a
means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and (k) the degree to which the
needs of a basin State may be satisfied, without causing substantial injury
to a co-basin State.
Id. For an example of balancing riparian interests, see supra note 37.
94. See Helsinki Rules, supra note 2, at art. V. The States must thus balance
their conflicting interests and design an equitable solution. See LkmmERs, supra
note 2, at 364.
95. See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supra note 2, at 52-53 (stating ILC
expressly endorsed concept that "internationally-shared waters create a community
of states sharing property in the water"). Although Benvenisti supports the concept of "community of property," he believes that the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles are
a hurdle to the international community's acceptance of this concept, because the
Articles do not fully implement the concept. See Benvenisti, supra note 21, at 413.
Benvenisti suggests that the Draft Articles send out the wrong signal that litigation
is the primary means of obtaining optimal utilization rather than negotiations resulting in the formation of joint management institutions. See id. at 414. In his
commentary, Benvenisti suggests that the "detailed provision on settlement of disputes" overshadows the "uninspiring draft article on management." Id. For a discussion of the Articles on settlement of disputes, see infra notes 149-57. For the
text of Article 24 (the joint management article), see infra note 102.
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respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner."96 Like the Helsinki Rules, the 1994
U.N. Draft Articles also supply a list of factors to be weighed in de97
termining equitable and reasonable utilization.
The 1994 U.N. Draft Articles further stipulate that an international watercourse "shall be used and developed by watercourse
States with a view to attaining optimal utilization thereof and benefits therefrom consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse." 98 However, optimal utilization implies that riparian States
must work together to achieve the optimal use of the watercourse as
if no State boundaries existed. 99 Optimal utilization, which is the
essential element of the "community of property" concept, is not
yet accepted as a general principle of international law. °°
96. 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, at art. 5(1).
97. See id. at art. 6. The factors include:
(a) geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and
other factors of a natural character; (b) the social and economic needs of
the watercourse States concerned; (c) the dependency of the population
on the watercourse; (d) the effects of the use or uses of the watercourse
in one watercourse State on other watercourse States; (e) existing and
potential uses of the watercourse; (f) conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse and
the costs of measures taken to that effect; (g) the availability of alternatives, of corresponding value, to a particular planned or existing use.
Id.
98. Id. at art. 5(1). The goal of optimal utilization is also found in Article 8.
Article 8, labeled a "General obligation to cooperate," reads: "[w]atercourse States
shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and mutual
benefit in order to attain optimal utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse." Id. at art. 8.

99. See LAmmymS, supra note 2, at 371. Optimal utilization requires a greater
sharing of interests than the concept of equitable utilization which only requires
an equitable delimitation of rights and duties between riparian States. See id.

100. See id. "Community of property" treats the whole watercourse as one hydrological unit which States should manage as one integrated whole. See David J.
Lazerwitz, Article, The Fow of International WaterLaw: The InternationalLaw Commission's Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 247, 252 (1993). "Community of property" is realized by- "(a) developing and managing the water basin as a unit without regard to international borders, ideally through a joint transnational institutional structure; (b) sharing the
benefits of that development and management according to an agreed formula or
procedure; and (c) establishing a procedure for constructive investigation and
peaceful resolution of disputes." Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supra note 2,
at 52. States do not endorse the community of property approach because they
are not willing to relinquish their sovereignty over a natural resource to the extent
necessary to achieve optimal utilization of a watercourse. See id. at 53.
Although the theory of community of property is not yet recognized by States,
the United Nations continually promotes this approach. See id. at 52. This endorsement was evidenced in the final report of the U.N. Water Conference at Mar
del Plata in 1977 which stated: "[i]t is necessary for States to cooperate in the case
of shared water resources in recognition of the growing economic, environmental
and physical interdependencies across international frontiers. Such cooperation

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997

23

458

Villanova ENVIRONMENTAL
Environmental Law Journal,
Vol.JouRNAL
8, Iss. 2 [1997], Art.
4
[Vol.
VILLANOVA
LAW

VIII: p. 435

Although the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles endorse the "community of property" concept, they do not explicitly require States to
achieve this level of cooperation. 1 0° The ILC does not link the goal
of optimal utilization to the joint management of international watercourses. 0 2 Thus, the Draft Articles fail to fully implement the
"community of property" concept. 10 3
C.

Relevance of Existing Uses

Article VIII of the Helsinki Rules provides a conditional priority to existing beneficial uses.' 0 4 Although Article V lists existing
uses as one of the relevant factors in determining equitable utilization, Article VIII grants reasonable existing uses a preference over
other uses.10 5 Article VIII states that "[a]n existing reasonable use
may continue in operation unless the factors justifying its continuance are outweighed by other factors leading to the conclusion that
it be modified or terminated so as to accommodate a competing
06
incompatible use."'
must be exercised on the basis of the equality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States." Id. (quoting Report of the United Nations Water Conference, Mar del
Plata,Argentina, General Assembly, at 53, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.70/29 (1977)).
101. See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supra note 2, at 52-53 (stating
"concept that internationally-shared waters create a community of states sharing
property in the water was also expressly endorsed in the Draft Articles .... ").
102. See Benvenisti, supranote 21, at 413-14. The Draft Articles provide a general obligation to cooperate and to share information but do not require cooperation to the extent endorsed in the theory of "community of property." See id.; 1994
ILC Report, supra note 2, at arts. 8, 9, 11-19. For a discussion of the requirements
for the achievement of "community of property," see supra note 100.
Article 24 of the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles encompasses management of international watercourses. See 1994 ILC Repor4 supra note 2, at art. 24(1). Article
24(1) reads: "[w]atercourse States shall, at the request of any of them, enter into
consultations concerning the management of an international watercourse, which
may include the establishment of ajoint management mechanism." Id. The Draft
Articles fail to link the joint management proposal in Article 24 to the goal of
optimal utilization found in Articles 5(1) and 8. See Benvenisti, supra note 21, at
413.
103. See Benvenisti, supra note 21, at 413-14.
104. See Helsinki Rules, supranote 2, at art. VIII; CompareLAMMERS, supra note
2, at 364 (describing how theory of "prior appropriation" gives absolute preference
to existing water uses). For a discussion of "prior appropriation," see supra notes
38-41, 45-47 and accompanying text.
105. See Helsinki Rules, supranote 2, at art. VI, VIII. Article V(2) (d) provides
that "the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular existing
utilization" should be weighed with the other relevant factors to determine a reasonable and equitable share. Id. at art. V. The Helsinki Rules provide additional
support for present reasonable uses in Article VII which states that "[a] basin State
may not be denied the present reasonable use of the waters of an international
drainage basin to reserve for a co-basin State a future use of such waters." Id. at
art. VII.
106. Id. at art. VIII(1).
...
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The priority does not presume that the existing use can continue indefinitely, but it does provide a starting point for determining how the resource should be allocated. 10 7 The State can
continue an existing use so long as the use is reasonable. 108 If a
State does claim that the use should be terminated or reallocated,
the State claiming the change would be required to justify its
position.10 9
The 1994 U.N. Draft Articles reject the concept of conditional
priority for reasonable existing uses. 10 Specifically, Article 6 stipulates that existing and potential uses of the watercourses shall be
considered equally along with all of the other relevant factors set
forth in Article 6 in determining equitable and reasonable utilization."' Moreover, the ILC announced that this scheme was created
purposefully "in order to emphasize that neither [use] is given
112
priority."
D.

Substantial Harm v. Significant Harm

The Helsinki Rules require that States not cause "substantial
injury" to the territory of co-basin States." 3 Some scholars accept
this point as a second governing principle which complements the
107. See Benvenisti, supra note 21, at 408. For example, if an upper riparian
State builds a dam which only minimally reduces the flow of water to a lower riparian State, the lower riparian State would not have a strong claim for redistribution. See id. at 409 (stating that "[a] strong claim for redistribution can be made
when the existing allocation is grossly unequal"). The upper riparian State could
continue to use the dam provided that no State could claim and then prove its
unreasonableness. See id. at 408-09.
108. See id.
109. See id. If the use ceases to be reasonable, then the State claiming the
unreasonableness would have to show that other factors outweigh the continuance
of the use in an Article VIII balancing test. See id.; Helsinki Rules, supra note 2, at
art. VIII.
110. See Benvenisti, supra note 21, at 409.
111. See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, at art. 6; see also Benvenisti, supra note
21, at 409 (discussing Article 6).
112. 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, at 233.
113. See Helsinki Rules, supra note 2, at art. X. Article X reads as follows:
1. Consistent with the principle of equitable utilization of the waters of
an international drainage basin, a State (a) must prevent any new
form of water pollution or any increase in the degree of existing
water pollution in an international drainage basin which would cause
substantial injury in the territory of a co-basin State, and (b) should
take all reasonable measures to abate existing water pollution in an
international drainage basin to such an extent that no substantial
damage is caused in the territory of a co-basin State.
2. The rule stated in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to water pollution originating: (a) within a territory of the State, or (b) outside the
territory of the State, if it is caused by the State's conduct.
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equitable utilization rule. 114 The Helsinki Rules do not resolve,
however, the issue of which principle prevails if the two come into
115
conflict.
The 1991 U.N. Draft Articles prohibit States from causing "appreciable harm" to other watercourse states.1 16 The quantitative
term "appreciable" "has been deliberately chosen as being less than
'substantial' (as in the ILA rules) and more than 'perceptible. ' "1 1 7
The 1994 U.N. Draft Articles changed the threshold of "appreciable

114. See Dellapenna, Designingthe Legal Structures, supra note 13, at 81. Article
X of the Helsinki Rules supports this position. For the pertinent text of Article X,
see supra note 113.
115. See Dellapenna, Designingthe Legal Structures, supra note 13, at 81. Article
X provides that States should both follow the equitable utilization rule and prevent
substantial injury to other States but stops short of stating which concept trumps
the other in case of a conflict between the two rules. See Helsinki Rules, supra note
2, at art. X(1). For the text of Article X(1), see supra note 113. However, Article V
of the Helsinki Rules addresses "the degree to which the needs of a basin State may
be satisfied, without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State" as one of the
balancing factors. See Helsinki Rules, supra note 2, at art. V. One commentator
suggests that the inclusion of this phrase in Article V implies that substantial injury
is just one factor to be weighed in an Article V balancing test. See Patricia K.
Wouters, An Assessment of Recent Developments in International Watercourse Law
Through the Prism of the SubstantiveRules Governing Use Allocation, 36 NAT. RESOuRcES
J. 417, 422 & n.27 (1996). Thus, in her commentary, she suggests that equitable
utilization is the "overarching principle." Id. at 420 (citing Report of the Fifty-Second
Conferenc ILA, Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, at
484, 496-97, arts. IV, X (1966); Report of the Sixtieth Conference ILA, Montreal
Rules on Pollution, at 531, 535, art. 1 (1982); Report of the Sixty-Second Conference, H1A, Seoul Complementary Rules, at 232, art. 1 (1986)).
116. See 1991 ILC Report supra note 51, at art. 7. Article 7 previously read:
"[w] atercourse States shall utilize an international watercourse in such a way as not
to cause appreciable harm to other watercourse States." Id. Appreciable harm
"refers to costs that can be objectively measured as a result of denial of water
rights." Elmusa, supra note 22, at 239. The result of State action amounts to appreciable harm if it causes "a real impairment of use, i.e., a detrimental impact of
some consequence upon, for example, public health, industry, property, agriculture or the environment." Id. (citing 1988 ILC Report).
117. See Hayton, supra note 82, at 41. Robert D. Hayton was a rapporteur for
the International Law Association Water Resources Committee. See id. at 31 n.d.
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harm" to that of "significant harm."1 18 The significance of this
change in phraseology is debated in the scholarly community.1 1 9
The main focus of the debate is the relationship between Article 5 and Article 7 of the Draft Articles. 120 To determine whether
equitable and reasonable utilization exists, Article 5 requires an
analysis of all factors enumerated in Article 6.121 Article 7 prohibits
States from causing significant harm to other riparian States.' 22 At
issue is which concept should prevail when the two come into conflict.' 23 If the no-harm rule prevails, a State would not be able to

118. The new Article 7 reads:
Obligation not to cause significant harm
1. Watercourse States shall exercise due diligence to utilize an international watercourse in such a way as not to cause significant harm to
other watercourse States.
2. Where, despite the exercise of due diligence, significant harm is
caused to another watercourse State, the State whose use causes the
harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, consult with the
State suffering such harm over:
(a) the extent to which such use has proved equitable and reasonable taking into account the factors listed in article 6;
(b) the question of ad hoc adjustments to its utilization, designed to
eliminate or mitgate any such harm caused and, where appropriate, the question of compensation.
1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, at art. 7.
119. Compare McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note 68, at 399-400
with Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structures, supra note 13, at 84-85.
120. See McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note 68, at 399.
121. See 1994 ILC Repor supra note 2, at arts. 5, 6. For the seven factors of
equitable and reasonable utilization, see supranote 97. Article 6 does not include
harm or injury as factors to be weighed in the balancing test. See 1994 ILC Report,
supra note 2, at art. 5. However, Article V of the Helsinki Rules arguably includes
substantial injury in its balancing test. See Helsinki Rules, supra note 2, at art. V.
For a discussion of this argument, see supra note 115. Wouters implies that the
omission of the terms "harm" and "injury" from the factors of Article 6, especially
in light of their inclusion in the Helsinki Rules balancing test, supports the primacy of the no-harm rule. See Wouters, supra note 115, at 422 & n.27.
122. See 1994 LLC Report, supra note 2, at art. 7. For the text of Article 7, see
supra note 118.
123. See McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note 68, at 399. For example, Hungary and Slovakia's proposal to develop the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(the Project) creates both positive and negative effects on the environment of the
Danube River. See Paul R. Wiliams, InternationalEnvironmentalDispute Resolution:
The Dispute Between Slovakia and Hungary ConcerningConstruction of the Gabcikovo and
Nagymaros Dams, 19 COLuM.J. ENvrL. L. 1, 3-20 (1994). The Project seeks to divert
the flow of the Danube River for various purposes which potentially could be beneficial to the environment and the citizens of the Danube Basin. See id. at 3, 6-9.
Among other things, the Project "would provide needed electricity to its participants at relatively low environmental cost," "would provide necessary flood protection for the Danube plain," "would substantially enhance the navigability of the
Danube River," and would "improve the ability of the Soviet Fleet to manoeuver
within the waterways of Eastern Europe and reduce the shipping costs of Soviet
goods." Id. at 7-8. However, the Project could cause "substantial environmental
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124 If
engage in an activity that significantly harms another State.
the equitable utilization doctrine prevails, however, the harm would
be just one factor to be weighed against the other factors contained
in Article 6.12
The 1991 U.N. Draft Articles found that the no-harm rule prevailed because the use of an international watercourse that causes
appreciable harm to another State is not equitable. 126 One commentator, Stephen C. McCaffrey, suggests that the new Article 7
does not eliminate the primacy of the no-harm rule, "but softens
the regime by making two important changes in Article 7. "127 The
first change is the addition of the requirement that States use "due

degradation of the Danube River region." Id. at 3. Negative impacts on the Danube River include:
disruption of forests and river banks in immediate areas of construction;
disruption of filtration for and the amount of drinking water supplies;
drying out of the river bed and innundation of new reservoir areas with
attendant alteration of ecosystems; disappearance of fish from the river
due to their inability to adjust to the new canal and altered river bed;
reduction in the water table with corresponding loss of nearby crops; increased susceptibility to flooding and earthquakes; and the stranding of
significant human populations... in the area between the canal and river
bed.
Neil A. F. Popovic, In PursuitofEnvironmentalHuman Rights: Commentay of the Draft
Declarationof Pranciplesof Human Rights and the Environment, COLUm. Hum. RTS. L.
REv. 487, 529 (1996).
Slovakia claims that the Project will only create minimal environmental dangers which environmental benefits will outweigh. See Williams, supra, at 18. Hungary asserts that the Project will harm the environment and thus should be
terminated. See id. at 14. In an equitable utilization/no-harm analysis, the issue
would be whether Slovakia would be allowed to cause significant harm to the environment by continuing the creation of the Project if an Article 6 balancing test
weighed in favor of continuing the Project.
The Hungary and Slovakia dispute over the creation of the Project is currently
before the International Court of Justice. See Case Concerning the GabcikovoNagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1994 I.C.J. 151 (Dec. 20). For a description
of the characteristics of the Danube River, see supra note 9.
124. See McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note 68, at 399. Continuing with the Danube River analysis introduced in note 123, if the no-harm rule
prevailed, Slovakia would be unable to continue the Project even if the balancing
test weighed in its favor, because the prevention of substantial harm is the primary
concern.
125. See id. Continuing with the Danube River analysis, if the equitable utilization rule prevailed, Slovakia would be allowed to continue the Project if after
weighing all of the factors, the use was deemed to be reasonable.
126. See id. The Commission's commentary to Article 7 (numbered Article 8
as initially adopted in 1988) stated that "prima facia, at least- utilization of an international watercourse ... is not equitable if it causes other watercourse States appreciable harm." Id. at 399 n.28 (quoting 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, pt. 2 at 36
(1988)).
127. McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Artices, supra note 68, at 399. McCaffrey
states that an absolute no-harm rule does not coincide with State practice and
could cause more problems than it could solve. See id. at 401.
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diligence" not to cause significant harm to other States. 28 This
clarifies the standard of responsibility that States owe to one
another. 129
The second change in Article 7 is the addition of paragraph 2,
which requires states that cause significant harm, in spite of due
diligence, to consult the injured State. 3 0° This addition suggests
that the causation of significant harm "is not per se a breach of the
state's international obligations."' 3 l Although the new Article 7
does not reverse the priority of the no-harm rule, it "mitigates the
absolute priority given the no-harm rule under the 1991 articles
"132

Another commentator, Professor Joseph W. Dellapenna, supports the position that this change in Article 7 "signals a greater
recognition of the need for balancing the interests of the competing states in order to determine whether the infliction of harm violates the norms of customary international law." 13 Professor
Dellapenna reasons that the addition of the due diligence standard
reduces the absolute command of the no-harm rule and that the
128. See id. at 399. Due diligence is defined as: "[s]uch a measure of prudence, activity, or assiduity, as is properly to be expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent man under the particular circumstances; not
measured by any absolute standard, but depending on the relative facts of the
special case." BLAcK's LAw DIGCIONARY 457 (6th ed. 1990).
The Commentary to Article 7 explained that "[a] watercourse State can be
deemed to have violated its due diligence obligation only if it knew or ought to
have known that the particular use of an international watercourse would cause
substantial harm to other watercourse States." Wouters, supra note 115, at 423
(citing 1994 U.N. Draft Articles, at commentary to art. 7, para. 5). Wouters interErets the Commentary to mean that a State can only initiate a use if the State
ows or should know that the use will not cause significant harm to other States.
See id. Thus, Wouters suggests that the Commentary supports the proposition that
the no-harm rule preempts the equitable utilization principle. See id.
129. See McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Artices, supra note 68, at 399-400. The
addition of the phrase "due diligence" settled a debate in the ILC over the responsibilty of States. Id. For a discussion of the debate, see Stephen C. McCaffrey, The
Law of InternationalWatercourses: Some Recent Developments and Unanswered Questions,
17 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 505, 519-25 (1989) [hereinafter McCaffrey, Recent
Developments]. McCaffrey argues that the addition of "due diligence" just makes
explicit what was already implicit because State practice does not require that
States achieve absolute results. See McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note
68, at 399.
130. See McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note 68, at 400.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 401. The commentary suggests that some kinds of serious harm
could never be both equitable and reasonable. See id. at 400. "A use which causes
significant harm to human health and safety is understood to be inherently inequitable and unreasonable." Id. (citing 1994 ILC Repor4 supra note 2, at 242).
133. Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structures, supra note 13, at 84-85. Dellapenna states that McCaffrey's conclusion "ignores the express provisions of the
Drafts Articles." Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supra note 2, at 39.
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compensation provision makes explicit the responsibility of States
to compensate for unequitable and unreasonable uses.13 4 Thus, he
suggests that "the rewritten Article 7 is explicitly subordinated to
the now clearly primary rule of equitable utilization in [A]rticle
5."135

Neither the text of Article 7 nor the Commission's commentary clearly indicate whether the no-harm rule preempts the rule of
equitable utilization.1 3 6 The interpretations of both Professor McCaffrey and Professor Dellapenna regarding the relationship between Article 5 and Article 7 receive support in the international
community.'3 7 Unfortunately, the issue of which principle trumps
the other when the two come into conflict remains unresolved.
E.

Dispute Prevention & Dispute Resolution

The Helsinki Rules recommend mechanisms for dispute prevention and dispute resolution while the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles
provide extensive mandatory rules.' 3 8 The Helsinki Rules highlight
the obligation of States to settle disputes by peaceful means so as
not to endanger international peace, security andjustice.13 9 In an
134. See Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structures, supra note 13, at 85.
135. Id. Dellapenna asserts that the absolute primacy of the no-appreciable
harm rule does not reflect the reality of water usage. See Dellapenna, Treaties as
Instruments, supra note 2, at 39. It prohibits any meaningful use that an upper
riparian State could implicate. See id.
136. See McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Artices, supra note 68, at 400. The ILC's
effort to clarify which rule takes preference in its Commentary to Article 7 only
made the matter more confusing. See Wouters, supra note 115, at 423. The Commentary stated that Artide 7 "is setting forth a process aimed at avoiding significant harm as far as possible while reaching an equitable result in concrete cases."
Id. (citing 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, at commentary to art. 7, para. 1). The
Commentary goes on to say that in some cases, the "'equitable and reasonable
utilization' of an international watercourse may still involve significant harm to
another watercourse State." Id. (citing 1994 JLC Report, supra note 2, at commentary to art. 7, para. 2). The Commentary further states that "the principle of equitable utilization remains the guiding criterion in balancing the interests at stake."
Id. (citing 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, at commentary to art. 7, para. 2). However, the Commentary further states that the obligation in Article 7 "sets the
threshold for lawful States activity." Id. (citing 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, at
commentary to art. 7, para. 4). Thus, the paradoxical statements contained in the
Commentary do not resolve the debate. See id.
137. See Wouters, supra note 115, at 420 (acknowledging primacy of no-harm
rule); Benvenisti, supranote 21, at 404 (stating "ILC should be commended for the
finally adopted formula, which gives priority to the equitable utilization standard
over the no appreciable harm rule").
138. For a discussion of the recommendations of the Helsinki Rules, see infra
notes 139-48 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the mandatory rules of
the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles, see infra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
139. See Helsinki Rules, supra note 2, at art. XXVII. These obligations are
consistent with States' obligations under the U.N. Charter. See id.
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effort to prevent disputes, the Rules recommend that States furnish
information on the waters of a drainage basin to other States whose
interests may be substantially affected, yet the Rules do not require
such communication. 140 According to the Rules, States should provide notice of any construction which will alter the shared basin and
should include facts of the alteration to allow the other States to
assess the situation. 14 1 Further, the State providing notice should
give the States receiving notice reasonable time to submit their
views on the alteration. 142 If the State fails to provide notice, the
alteration will not be given the temporal priority usually given to
43
construction projects.
The Helsinki Rules also recommend that States enter into negotiations if a dispute arises. 44 The Rules further recommend that
States refer their disputes over international drainage basins to a
joint agency to make recommendations for efficient use of the
drainage basin. 145 If it appears that a dispute cannot be resolved
140. See id. at art. XXIX. Article XXIX states:
1. With a view to preventing disputes from arising between States as to
their legal rights or other interest, it is recommended that each basin State
furnish relevant and reasonably available information to the other basin
States concerning the waters of a drainage basin within its territory and its
use of, and activities with respect to such waters.
2. A State, regardless of its location in a drainage basin, should in particular furnish to any other basin State, the interests of which may be substantially affected, notice of any proposed construction or installation
which would alter the regime of the basin in a way which might give rise
to a dispute as defined in Article XXVI. The notice should include such
essential facts as will permit the recipient to make an assessment of the
probable effects of the proposed alteration.
3. A State providing the notice referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article
should afford to the recipient a reasonable period of time to make an
assessment of the probable effect of the proposed construction or installation and to submit its views thereon to the State furnishing the notice.
4. If a State has failed to give the notice referred to in paragraph 2 of
this Article, the alteration by the State in the regime of the drainage basin
shall not be given the weight normally accorded to temporal priority in
use in the event of a determination of what is a reasonable and equitable
share of the waters of the basin.
Id. (emphasis added).
141. See id. at art. XXIX(1), (2).
142. See id. at XXIX(3).
143. See id. at art. XXIX(4); see also id. at art. VIII(2) (stating "[a] use that is in
fact operational is deemed to have been an existing use from the time of the initiation of construction"). For a discussion of the priority of existing uses, see supra
notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
144. See Helsinki Rules, supra note 2, at art. XXX.
145. See id. at art. XXXI. The States should request the agency to survey the
international drainage basin and to make recommendations for the most efficient
use of the basin in the interests of all the States. See id. at art. XXXI(1). In appropriate cases, non-basin States who are parties to a treaty of the international drain-
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through the efforts of ajoint agency, States may seek mediation by a
third State, a qualified international organization, or a qualified
person. 14 6 If States cannot agree to measures recommended by any
of the third parties mentioned above, the Helsinki Rules next recommend that the States form a conciliation commission dedicated
to resolving the dispute. 147 If the commission does not solve the
dispute, the Rules then recommend that States submit their disputes to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal, a permanent arbitral tribunal
or the International Court of Justice. 4 8
Unlike the Helsinki Rules, the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles require
States planning measures which could have an "appreciable adverse
effect" upon other watercourse States to provide mandatory notice
to the affected States.' 49 Further, the State must include available
technical data and information with the notice to allow States to
assess the effects of the planned measures.' 50 Absent an agreement
and urgent circumstances, the State giving notice must allow the
States receiving notice a six-month period in which to evaluate the
effects of the measures and respond to the State giving notice.' 5 1
The Articles go further to require the State giving notice to furnish
additional information upon request and to prohibit the impleage basin should be invited to associate themselves with the work of the joint
agency or be allowed to appear before it. See id. at art. XXXI(3).
146. See id. at art. XXXII.
147. See id. at art. XXXIII. The States should form a commission of inquiry or
an ad hoc conciliation commission in accordance with the manner set forth in the
Annex. See id.
148. See id. at XXXIV. If a commission has not been formed as provided for
in Article XXXIII, or the commission has not found an appropriate solution to
recommend, or the commission's recommended solution has been rejected by the
States, then the States should turn to the tribunals or the International Court of
Justice. See id. The Helsinki Rules recommend the use of the Model Rules on
Arbitral Procedure prepared by the U.N. ILC at its tenth session in 1958 if the
States choose arbitration. See id. at XXXV. If the States resort to arbitration, the
award given is final and should be executed in good faith. See id. at XXXVI.
149. 1994 LL.C. Report, supra note 2, at art. 12. Article 12 reads:
[biefore a watercourse State implements or permits the implementation
of planned measures which may have an appreciable adverse effect upon
other watercourse States, it shall provide those States within timely notification thereof. Such notification shall be accompanied by available technical data and information in order to enable the notified States to
evaluate the possible effects of the planned measures.
Id.
150. See id.
151. See id. at art. 13(a). Upon request, the State receiving notice can extend
the evaluation period for no more than six months. See id. at 13(b). However,
Article 19 allows immediate implementation of planned measures if they are "of
the utmost urgency in order to protect public health, public safety or other equally
important interests." Id. at art. 19(1). In such case, the implementing State must
send a formal declaration of the urgency to the affected States. See id. at art. 19(2).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss2/4

32

1997]

Sergent: Comparison
of the Helsinki
Rules to the 1994 U.N.
Draft Articles:
INTERNATIONAL
WATERCOURSE
LAW

467

mentation of the measures without the consent of the notified
States. 152 Moreover, the Articles also require the States giving and
receiving notice to enter into consultations and negotiations "with a
view to arriving at an equitable resolution of the situation." 153
If the State fails to give notice, affected States may request the
State to send notification and available information. 54 If the notifying State believes that it is under no obligation to notify the requesting State, it must then send the requesting State a
documented explanation of why it owes no obligation. 5 5 Further,
if the requesting State wishes to enter into negotiations, then the
States must promptly do so.' 6 In addition, the notifying State must
suspend implementation of its planned measures for no more than
1 57
six months if the other State requests such delay.
VI.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF UNDERLYING PROVISIONS OF THE

HELSINKI RuLs AND THE

A.

1994 U.N. DRAFTr ARTIcLs

Significance of Excluding Navigation and Confined
Groundwater From the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles

The exclusion of rules for navigation and confined groundwater from the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles renders the Articles incomplete.' 58 If the United Nations endorse the 1994 Draft Articles,
States must still look to the Helsinki Rules for guidance of which
navigational rules to follow. 159 Some scholars believe that the ILC
152. See id. at art. 16(1). If the notifying State does not receive a response
within the six-month period, it can proceed with the implementation of its
planned measures in accordance with the notification. See id. Additionally, the
notifying State can offset any claim to compensation by the State that failed to
reply within the six-month period with expenses incurred for the action that would
not have been taken if the State had properly responded within the six-month
period. See id. at 16(2).
153. Id. at art. 17(1). In consulting and negotiating, each State shall "in good
faith pay reasonable regard to the rights and legitimate interests of the other
State." Id. at 17(2).
154. See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, at art. 18(1). The watercourse State
must have serious reason to believe that the measures will have an appreciable
adverse effect upon it and must send a documented explanation of the reasons for
making the request. See id.
155. See id. at art. 18(2).
156. See id.
157. See id. at art. 18(3).
158. See generally Scanlan, supra note 5 (discussing problems of excluding confined groundwater from scope of U.N. Draft Articles).
159. See Hayton, supra note 82, at 34 (stating some scholars believe Helsinki
Rules fully address navigational issues). Some States rely heavily on navigational
regulation. See Linnerooth, supra note 9, at 634. For instance, navigation is an
important issue for forming agreements regarding the Danube River. See id. The
geography of the Danube presents burdensome obstacles to navigation. See id.
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purposely omitted rules for navigation from the 1994 U.N. Draft
Articles, because the Helsinki Rules fully addressed this issue. 16°
Although the Helsinki Rules provide adequate rules for navigation,
States still disagree on fine points of the rules, including the extent
of the right of "free navigation." 16' Therefore, the ILC should have
taken the opportunity to clarify these points and drafted articles for
navigational uses of water.' 62
In addition, the ILC should have taken the opportunity to develop international groundwater law. 163 The international community has a heightened interest in regulating groundwater because
States have been increasingly raiding their own groundwater supplies. 164 Further, the regulation of groundwater is extremely important because some of these water sources have very little
Large shallow stretches, dangerous rapids, tremendous amounts of ice in winter,
and heavy spring floods call for navigational rules to follow in using the Danube
river. See id.
160. See Hayton, supra note 82, at 34.
161. See id. States are unclear as to the extent of Articles XIII and XIV. See id.
at n.10.
162. See id. at 34 (describing problems of not including navigation rules in
1994 U.N. Draft Articles).
163. See Rosenstock, Second Report, supra note 70 (recommending inclusion of
groundwater to Draft Articles); McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Artices, supra note 68,
at 403 (stating "[o] ne hopes... [the] omission [of groundwater] will be corrected
in further work on the draft by governments.").
164. See LeRoy, supranote 1, at 299. Water covers 70% of the earth, but only a
small percentage constitutes renewable freshwater. See id. The earth contains the
same amount of water today as it did 2,000 year ago, but the world population has
increased from 300 million people to 5.7 billion people with a projected increase
to 10 billion by the year 2050. See id. The increased demand for water by the
growing population has caused States to rely on nonrenewable freshwater to temporarily fill the demand. See id. at 311. For example, in 1990, nine countries
raided nonrenewable water sources which in total exceeded 100% of renewable
water supplies. See id. at 311.
Libya, Qatar, Jordan, Israel and Saudi Arabia all rely on unrenewable water
supplies. See id. at 312. Libya withdraws almost four times the amount of its renewable water supply. See id. Libya's water usage could potentially surpass its groundwater supply in the next few decades. See id. In addition, China's groundwater use
has caused the water tables of wells serving 10 cities to drop one meter per year.
See Scanlan, supra note 5, at 2191 (citing WORLD BANK, WORLD DEvFFxLop?.rr REPORT 1992: DEvELOPMENrr AND THE E moirrr, at 50 (1992)). Moreover, the
overpumping of groundwater in Bangkok caused the sewage and water pipes to
collapse which in turn flooded parts of the city and allowed seawater to infiltrate
the city's water system. See id. at 2191-92 (citing WORLD BANK, at 98 (1992)).
Even the U.S. relies on groundwater to support the population's increased
demand for water. See WENDY GORDON, NATuRAL RESouRcEs DEFENSE CouNcIL,
INC., A CrIZEN'S HANDBOOK ON GROUNDWATER PROTECrION 11 (1984). Groundwater "provides an abundant, reliable, and economical water supply that can be
used in a variety of activities for which surface water, due to its greater seasonal
variations in volume and temperature, would be uneconomical or infeasible." Id.
The U.S. increased its groundwater use from 21 billion gallons per day in 1945 to
88 billion gallons per day in 1980. See id.
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recharge capability. 165 Consequently, if water is taken from these
sources faster than it is replenished, the continued withdrawal
16 6
could extinguish States' water supplies.
States thus need to regulate their use of non-renewable
groundwater to avoid exhausting their water supply. However, international law regulating groundwater is extremely sparse, which
makes it difficult for States to form agreements and settle disputes
on shared groundwater. 6 7 The ILC recognized this problem; however, it has chosen to defer the issue to the international community for resolution. 168 Unfortunately, the problem with this
deferment is that no other institution has the influence of a U.N.
organ nor the benefit of consulting States on their views. 169 Because the ILC has the opportunity to aid the development of international law, the ILC should have taken it upon itself to resolve this
problem and develop rules for international groundwater law. 1 70
B.

1994 U.N. Draft Articles as an Innovative Approach Towards
"Community of Property"

The theory of equitable utilization as set forth in the Helsinki
Rules has already been accepted by many States and has been incorporated into their State practice.' 7 1 In addition, equitable utiliza165. See LeRoy, supra note 1, at 304 n.24. For example, "water[s] in deep
aquifers... take hundreds of years to replenish themselves through the natural
hydrologic cycle." Id. at 311.
166. See id. at 304 n.24. Once non-renewable water sources are exhausted,
States will be forced to rely solely on renewable freshwater which will not support
the demand for water. See Robert Engelman, Editorial, But Not a Drop to Drink, THE
BALTnoRE SUN, Jan. 7, 1994, at 15A. "[T]he danger is that now-abundant nonrenewable water resources eventually will be sucked dry. Much more modest renewable resources would then be pressed to support populations that could not
have grown so numerous in the absence of non-renewable water." Id.
167. See Melissa Crane, Diminishing Water Resources and InternationalLaw: US.Mexico, A Case 24 CORNEm INT'L L.J. 299, 299 (1991). States can assert a wide
variety of claims over shared groundwater because they have no principles to guide
them. See id. Further, international principles regarding groundwater that do exist are too weak to be legally binding, because States do not yet accept them as law.
See id. Moreover, it is difficult to form legal principles regarding the allocation of
groundwater, because the nature of groundwater is scientifically uncertain. See id.
168. For a discussion of this deferment, see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
169. For a discussion of the questionnaires distributed by the ILC, see supra
notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
170. See Rosenstock, Second Report, supra note 70 (recommending inclusion of
groundwater to Draft Articles); McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note 68,
at 403 (stating "[o] ne hopes... [the] omission [of groundwater] will be corrected
in further work on the draft by governments.").
171. See LeRoy, supra note 1, at 319. Most agreements between States are
based on the principle of equitable utilization. See id. States in the Sengal, Lake
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dion has also been supported by international tribunals. 172 Thus, it
is already evident that the majority of States will accept this principle in forming their own international watercourse agreements. 7 3
The 1994 U.N. Draft Articles require equitable utilization but
also endorse the concept of "community of property."1 74 The ILC
acted both cautiously and innovatively when it endorsed the "community of property" approach but did not require that States
achieve this goal. 175 States may be reluctant to compromise their
State sovereignty to achieve such a level of cooperation.' 76 The ILC
attempted to balance this fear of non-compliance with the pressing
need to develop the law of international watercourses, however, the
"community of property" approach in the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles
"remains an imperfect obligation as there is no procedure to com177
pel the parties to succeed in the negotiations."
Chad, Kagera, Gambia and the Lower Mekong Basins have incorporated the Helsinki Rules into various international watercourse agreements. See Michael D.
Hodges, Report, The Rights and Responsibilitiesof Using an InternationalWaterway, 4J.
INT'L L. & Paic. 375, n.36 (1995). The equitable and reasonable utilization theory
also appears in such agreements as the Indus River Treaty and the Agreement on
Sharing of the Ganges Waters. See Indus Waters Treaty, Sept. 19, 1960, Pak.-India,
419 U.N.T.S. 125 (1962).
172. See Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the Oder
(Czech., Den., Fr., Ger., Swed., U.K, Pol.) 1929 P.C.IJ. (Ser. A) No. 23; Diversion
of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.IJ. (Ser. A/B) No. 70, (June
28); Lake Lanoux Arbitration, supra note 3, at 281.
173. See LeRoy, supra note 1, at 319 (stating most agreements between States
are based on equitable utilization theory); Bourne, supra note 54, at 216. In the
Commentary to Article 5 of the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles, the ILC stated that "a
survey of all available evidence of the general practice of States accepted as law, in
respect of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses ... reveals that
there is overwhelming support for the doctrine of equitable utilization as a general
rule of law for the determination of the rights and obligations of states in this
field." Bourne, supra note 54, at 216 (citing 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, at 222).
174. See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supra note 2, at 52-53. For a discussion of the ILC's endorsement of the concept of "community of property," see
supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
175. See Okidi, supra note 7, at 172 (stating intergovernmental institutions
tend to act cautiously and try to avoid potentially controversial formulations).
176. See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supra note 2, at 54. Dellapenna
suggests that international organizations, such as the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), provide
material incentives to States to pursue communal management projects. See id.
States find it difficult to negotiate international water projects if they see no benefit in curbing their use or pollution of an international watercourse. See LeRoy,
supra note 1, at 320. Thus, if organizations provide States with benefits, the States
will be more willing to cooperate. See id.
177. Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supranote 2, at 53; see 1994 LC Reort,
supra note 2, at arts. 8, 11-18. Dellapenna explains that "[t]he customary legal
obligation can only be expressed as an obligation to negotiate in good faith for the
creation of the necessary institutions." Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supra
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Benefits of Having a Conditional Priority for Existing Uses

The Helsinki Rules assert the stronger position with respect to
conditional priority for existing uses of international watercourses.
Reasonable existing uses should be given conditional priority because communities rely on the status quo. 178 Communities that expect a certain supply of water should not be deprived of their water
unless their use is unreasonable. 179 Moreover, this proposition promotes stability and efficiency because it allows States the opportunity to invest in reasonable, long-term planning. 8 0 As long as the
initial use continues to be reasonable, the State can continue to use
its resources in the same manner.1 8 1
Additionally, the priority given to existing uses provides incentives to States that have relied on the existing uses to enter into
agreements regarding international watercourses.18 2 If States relying on existing uses were not granted initial priority, they would be
reluctant to negotiate agreements out of fear of redistribution of
their resources.' 8 3 A State that does not have the benefit of an existing use, however, would be reluctant to negotiate for fear of continuation of the existing use.1 4
The opposing State always has the option to claim an unreasonable use and the opportunity to prove its unreasonableness because the continuance of the use is only conditional.18 5 If the use is
truly unreasonable, it will not be permitted to continue.1a6 If it is
reasonable, the State should be allowed to continue its conduct because the community relies on the existing use.' 8 7 Thus, the opposing State has nothing to lose in entering the agreement, because
note 2, at 53. For a discussion of how the ILC fails to implement the theory of
.community of property," see supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
178. See Benvenisti, supra note 21, at 408-09.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 408. The commentary on the Helsinki Rules explained that
"[a] State is unlikely to invest large sums of money in the construction of a dam if
it has no assurances of being afforded some legal protection for the use over an
extended period of time." Id. at 409 n.142 (citing commentary on the Helsinki
Rules, 52 ILA, Conference Report 484, 493 (1966)).
181. See Helsinki Rules, supra note 2, at art. VIII. For the text of Article VIII,
see supra text accompanying note 106.
182. See Benvenisti, supra note 21, at 409.
183. See id.
184. See LeRoy, supra note 1, at 320 (stating negotiations are difficult when
users see no benefit in curbing their use or pollution or when they perceive negotiation as hindrance to development).
185. See Helsinki Rules, supra note 2, at art. VIII.
186. See Benvenisti, supra note 21, at 409.
187. See id. at 408-09.
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the use would continue even without an agreement.'8s However,
the use might be terminated for unreasonableness with the conclusion of an agreement. 189
D.

Uncertainty about the Relationship Between Equitable

Utilization and the No-Harm Rule
The Helsinki Rules are insufficient in that they do not provide
an answer for what happens when the rule of equitable utilization
conflicts with the no-harm rule.190 Presently, the 1994 U.N. Draft
Articles also do not provide an answer because scholars cannot
agree on how to interpret the new language of Article 7 and its
relation to Article 5.191 Until one of the interpretations prevail, it is

impossible to determine the actual significance of these two Articles
to the international community. 92 However, even if the no-harm
rule prevails as the governing rule of the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles,
there is no guarantee that States will embrace the no-harm ap193
proach in settling international watercourse disputes.
188. See id. at 408.

189. See id.
190. See Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structures,supra note 13, at 81 (stating
ILA did not attempt "to work out the relation between the 'no harm' rule and the
'equitable utilization' rule"). Even though the Helsinki Rules do not explicitly
state whether the equitable utilization theory trumps the no-harm rule, some commentators believe that equitable utilization is the "overarching principle."
Wouters, supra note 115, at 420 (citing Report of the Fifty-Second Conference, ILA, Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, at 484, 496-97, arts.
IV, X (1966); Report of the Sixtieth Conference, ILA, Montreal Rules on Pollution, at
531, 535, art. 1 (1982); Report of the Sixty-Second Conference, ILA, Seoul Complementary Rules, at 232, art. 1 (1986)). For a discussion of Wouters' views, see supra note
115.
191. For a discussion of the conflicting interpretations of the relationship between Article 5 and Article 7, see supra notes 120-37 and accompanying text.
192. See Convention on the Law of the Non-NavigationalUses of International Water-

courses:Report of the SecretarGenera4,U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 146, at 4046, U.N. Doc. A/51/275 (1996), reprinted at <gopher://gopher.un.org/00/ga/
docs/51/plenary/A51-275.EN> (last visitedJan. 30, 1997) (discussing varying State
views on current interpretations of and proposed changes to Articles 5 and 7 of the
1994 U.N. Draft Articles) [hereinafter 1996 Report of the Secretary-General].
193. See Wouters, supra note 115, at 437. A recent survey of watercourse
agreements indicated that "[ilt is unlikely that states will embrace a no significant
harm approach to watercourse development, except in special cases where existing
uses are to be protected." Id. at 437. The only agreement surveyed that contained
the no-harm rule was the Israeli-Jordani Agreement which incorporates the rule to
protect existing uses. See id. at 436. By contrast, the United States commented that
"[t]he balance struck between equitable and reasonable utilization and participation (article 5) and the obligation not to cause significant harm (article 7) is a
good one, and worthy of widespread endorsement and application." 1996 Report of
the Secretary-General supra note 192, at *35.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss2/4

38

1997]
E.

Sergent: Comparison of the Helsinki Rules to the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles:
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSE LAW

Negotiation as a Beneficial Tool

The Helsinki Rules recommend negotiation to settle water disputes between States, but they do not require it. 9 4 The requirement of negotiation as a mechanism for dispute prevention as well
as for dispute settlement as set forth in the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles
provides a better approach to solving international water disputes
between States. 195 The requirement to negotiate "prod[s] the riparians to establish direct and 'thick' interaction." 96 Thus, it promotes the idea of cooperation in the management of international
watercourses. 1 97 However, there is no mechanism to compel States
to succeed in negotiations. 98 Therefore, the requirement to negotiate does not automatically produce full cooperation between riparian States. 199
Although the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles' requirement to negotiate is beneficial, it contains several inadequacies.2 00 First, the requirement to negotiate only applies to "planned measures."2 0 ' It
194. For a discussion of the Helsinki Rules' recommendations for dispute prevention and resolution, see supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
195. See Lazerwitz, supra note 100, at 266. For a discussion of the 1994 U.N.
Draft Articles dispute prevention and resolution requirements, see supra notes 14957 and accompanying text.
196. Benvenisti, supra note 21, at 400.
197. See id. at 400. States resolve the majority of water disputes by negotiation
and not by litigation. See id. Negotiations "are the key to initiating cooperation,
promoting confidence among riparians, and increasing the range of spheres of
communication and cooperation, even in spheres unrelated to the resource." Id.
198. See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supra note 2, at 53.
199. See Benvenisti, supra note 21, at 400-03. Prescribing the requirement to
negotiate "is not enough." Id. at 402. Benvenisti suggests that "to promote cooperation, international law should provide states with ample incentives to negotiate."
Id. at 400. Benvenisti also suggests that the law should incorporate a flexible standard of negotiation which would "include scientists from various disciplines who
could suggest alternative ways of reaching optimal solutions, and whose contributions could defuse the potentially adversarial dimension of the negotiations." Id. at
402.
200. See Charles B. Bourne, The InternationalLaw Commission's Draft Articles on
the Law ofInternational Watercourses:Principlesand PlannedMeasures, 3 COLO.J. INT'L
ENVrL. L. & POL'y 65, 68-71 (1992); Lazerwitz, supranote 100, at 266-67. These two
articles refer to the 1991 U.N. Draft Articles. See Bourne, supra, at 65 & n.2;
Lazerwitz, supranote 100, at 247 & n.5. Part Three of the 1991 U.N. Draft Articles
is almost identical to Part Three of the 1994 U.N. Articles except for the addition
of Articles 13(b) and 16(2) to the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles and the deletion of
Article 19(3) from the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles. Compare 1991 ILC Report supra
note 51, at arts. 11-19 with 1994 LC Report, supra note 2, at arts. 11-19.
201. SeeLazerwitz, supranote 100, at 266; 1994 LC Report supranote 2, at arts.
15, 17. The requirement to negotiate only applies to the implementation of
lanned measures which "would be inconsistent with the provisions of articles 5 or
." 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, at arts. 15, 17. For a discussion of Articles 5 and
7, see supra notes 120-37 and accompanying text.
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thus limits the negotiation requirement to future water uses and
fails to require negotiation to settle disputes regarding already ex20 2
isting water uses.
Second, the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles exhibit preferential treatment to notified States.2 03 If a notified State does not respond
within the six-month period, the notifying State "must either delay
implementation of its planned measures, or proceed to implement
them and run the risk of incurring uncertain legal liability if harm
results." 2°4 The notifying State can deduct actual expenses incurred in implementing plans that would not have been incurred if
the notified State timely responded from compensation claimed by
the notified States that did not timely respond.2 0 5 However, the
notifying State is still subject to the remaining liability for the notified State's claim to compensation. 20 6 On the other hand, the Articles do not impose any special sanctions on a notified State that
does not respond within the sixty-day period.2 0 7 Thus, the 1994
U.N. Draft Articles give the notified State an unfair advantage over
the notifying State.2 0 8 Despite these inadequacies, the 1994 U.N.
Draft Articles approach to dispute resolution through the requirement of negotiation is a beneficial contribution to the international
community.
VII.

CONCLUSION

For over thirty years the Helsinki Rules have provided the international community with helpful guidelines for regulating international watercourses.23 9 Many States have embraced the Rules
and have incorporated them into bilateral and multilateral trea-

202. See Lazerwitz, supra note 100, at 266.
203. See Bourne, Principles and PlannedMeasures, supra note 200, at 68-69.
204. Id. at 68-69.
205. See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, at art. 16(2).
206. See id.
207. See Bourne, Principles and PlannedMeasures, supra note 200, at 69.
208. See id. at 68-70. "There is, then, a lack of balance in the treatment of the
notifying State and the notified State for failure to comply with the required procedures; while the former remains legally bound by all provisions of the Draft Articles, the latter may ignore the procedural rules with impunity." Id. at 69.
209. See generally Bourne, ILA's Contribution supra note 54 (providing fLA's
contributions to water law). For a discussion of the work of the ILA, see supra
notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
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ties. 210 However, some States have ignored the Helsinki Rules and
21 1
chosen to follow their own rules or no rules at all.
The crux of the problem is not that the Helsinki Rules are outdated. To the contrary, the Rules apply just as much today as they
did when they were developed in 1966.212 However, there are two
main problems with the Helsinki Rules. First, the Helsinki Rules
can only be enforced on a voluntary basis. States can use the Helsinki Rules as a model for their own agreements only if they chose
to do so. The lack of enforcement power of the Helsinki Rules renders them insufficient to deal with international watercourse issues
today.
213
Second, the Rules themselves utilize unassuming language.
The Helsinki Rules are full of recommendations and optional responsibilities but sparse with mandatory obligations. Even if the
Helsinki Rules were themselves mandatory, the language within the
rules makes them fairly optional.
The potential enforcement power of the United Nations and
the commanding language within the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles provides a stronger foundation for international support than the
ILA's Helsinki Rules. Although the ILC and the United Nations as
a whole lack absolute enforcement power, the General Assembly
has the authority to make recommendations to Members of the
United Nations and to the Security Council.2 14 The General Assem210. For a discussion of States incorporating the Helsinki Rules and its provisions into international agreements, see supra note 171.
211. For example, States such as Israel have engaged in the unilateral taking
of water supplies. See Scanlan, supra note 5, at 2197-99. For a discussion of the
Israeli-Arab conflict, see supra note 32.
212. See Bourne, ILA's Contribution, supra note 54, at 213-14. Bourne stated
that:
[b]y 1966, in the Helsinki Rules, the ILA had identified the basic rule on
the subject [of international water resources]-the principle of equitable
utilization. In the intervening years the IIA has based its work on the
proposition that this principle is the fundamental law, the more detailed
rules subsequently adopted by it being merely more precise expressions
of the principle and subject to it. The principle, requiring the reasonable
and equitable sharing of the benefits of the waters of an international
drainage basin is seen as the best suited for achieving the rational management of these waters.
Id. The best evidence of the Helsinki Rules' influence is seen in the work of the
ILC which reveals overwhelming support for the theory of equitable utilization. See
id. at 215-16. But see McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Article, supra note 68, at 404
(stating Helsinki Rules "are now nearly thirty years old and fail to deal with key
issues").
213. For a discussion of the unassuming language of the Helsinki Rules, see
supra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
214. See U.N. CHARTEa art. 10. Article 10 states:
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bly can recommend that Member States use the 1994 U.N. Draft
Articles in forming their own international watercourse agreements
and can pass a resolution supporting the implementation of these
Articles.
In addition, the United Nations can enlist the "carrot and
stick" approach. The 1994 U.N. Draft Articles could be incorporated into the policies of U.N. agencies such as the Department of
Technical Cooperation for Development (UNCTCD), the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Development Program
(UNDP) and the Environmental Program (UNEP).215 The U.N.
agencies could help fund international water projects that utilize
the provisions of the Draft Articles in their international watercourse agreements. 2 16 The U.N. agencies could further refuse aid
to States that would not follow the principles of the Articles.2 17
Moreover, the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles require mandatory negotiation for planned measures but cannot force States to succeed
in the negotiations. 218 However, if the U.N. agencies help to fund
international water projects, States might be induced to succeed in
negotiations with other States.21 9 The Articles and the U.N. agencies would thus promote cooperation in managing international
watercourses.
Although the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles provide a stronger foundation for international support than the Helsinki Rules, the Articles do not respond to all of the current problems concerning
international watercourses. For example, the Draft Articles exclude
groundwater from its purview and do not directly address navigational issues.2 20 Furthermore, the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles contain
[t] he General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within
the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions
of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the
United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any questions or
matters.
Id.
215. See Lisa M.Jacobs, Comment, Sharing the Gifts of the Nile: Establishment of a
Legal Regimefor Ni Waters Management, 7 TEMP. INT'L & Comp. L.J. 95, 105 (1993).
216. See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supra note 2, at 54. For a discussion of providing incentives to States, see supra note 176.
217. SeeJacobs, supra note 215, at 104.
218. See Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments, supra note 2, at 53.
219. See Benvenisti, supra note 21, at 400 (stating that "international law
should provide states with ample incentives to negotiate").
220. For a discussion of the exclusion of groundwater from the 1994 U.N.
Draft Articles, see supra notes 158, 163-70 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the exclusion of navigational issues from the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles, see supra
notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
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inherent ambiguities, such as whether the principle of equitable
utilization or the no-harm rule prevails if the two come into conflict. 22 1 The failure of the ILC to provide guidelines for important
international concerns and to resolve inherent ambiguities within
the text itself renders the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles incomplete.
Although the Sixth Committee convened as a working group
from October 7 through October 11, 1996, to develop a framework
convention based on the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles, the Sixth Committee has not yet completed its task.22 2 The Sixth Committee presently has the opportunity to deviate from the 1994 U.N. Draft
Articles when forming the framework convention.22 3 Thus, it is still
possible for the Sixth Committee to improve upon the ILC's shortcomings. However, even if the Sixth Committee neither addresses
additional issues nor clarifies ambiguities, the framework convention will still be a progressive step towards codifying the interna2 24
tional law of watercourses.
Michele R Sergent
221. For a discussion of the controversy between the principle of equitable
utilization and the no-harm rule, see supra notes 120-37 and accompanying text.
222. See Activities of the Sixth Committ supra note 72. The Sixth Committee is
scheduled to reconvene from March 24 to April 4, 1997 to continue elaborating on
the framework convention. See Convention on the Law of InternationalWatercourses,
supra note 77. For a discussion of the activities of the Sixth Committee, see supra
notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
223. See McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note 68, at 403. McCaffrey
stated: "[i]t remains to be seen whether the working group will be able to agree
upon a text or whether, if it does, the articles will depart significantly from the
ILC's draft." Id. The Sixth Committee can also refer the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles
back to the ILC for reconsideration or redrafting. See Commission Repor, supra note
70, at para. 184. For a discussion of the Sixth Committee's options, see supra note
74.
224. See McCaffrey, Commission Adopts Articles, supra note 68, at 403. States
have responded positively to the 1994 U.N. Draft Articles because the Articles balance the interests of upper and lower riparian States. See id. Neither upper nor
lower riparian States have accepted the Draft Articles in their entirety nor wholly
rejected them. See id. The success of the framework convention will depend on
State acceptance. See id. at 403-04.
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